UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/746
23 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the text entitled "The Truth about Gorazde" of 4 May 1994, prepared by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee of the United States House of Representatives.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

BILL McCOLLUM, FLORIDA
CHAIRMAN

VAUGHN S. FORREST
CHIEF OF STAFF
YOSSEF BODANSKY
DIRECTOR
DONALD J. MORRISEY
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR
1672 LONGWORTH BUILDING
(202) 225-2871

TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC. 20515

THE TRUTH ABOUT GORAZDE

May 4, 1994

In recent weeks, the small industrial town of Gorazde in Bosnia-Hercegovina has come to symbolize in the eyes of the Western media the brutality of the latest Balkan war. The siege of Gorazde has been portrayed as a ruthless act of aggression against Bosnia's Muslim population and has become the focal point of Western efforts to put an end to the bloodshed. However, while Bosnian Serb aggressiveness has undoubtedly played a large part in the Gorazde tragedy, what is less known is the role played by the Bosnian government and military in instigating the conflict and in efforts to draw the West, particularly the United States, into the war generally.

The roots of this situation derive from the events of the Fall of 1992 at a relatively early stage of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. At that time, the Gorazde area was one of the first places where Islamist guerrillas -- a combined force of 'Afghan' volunteers (mainly Arab 'Afghans') and Bosnian Islamists -- had embarked on a systematic campaign against the local Christian population in order to secure a predominant military position.

The Islamists operated in detachments of some 15-20 highly trained and well equipped men and conducted repeated attacks along various roads, including the road to Gorazde, between Sarajevo and Muslim strongholds near the Serbian border. The growing frequency of these ambushes, many committed against Serb civilians, made them a dominant feature of the civil war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. (It is noteworthy that these Bosnian detachments were following exactly the principles of "the war of the weak" as outlined by the HizbAllah's Ayatollah Fadlallah.)

As a direct outcome of this campaign, the Bosnian Muslims were able to expand and consolidate their hold over the Gorazde enclave, allowing them to use it as a staging point for future military actions. It was at this point, in early 1993, that the Bosnian Muslims began rebuilding Gorazde as a military center.

/...

Thus, beginning in March 1993, and more so in the first half of April, Sarajevo succeeded in completing the deployment of large Muslim reinforcements into Gorazde. Indeed, many of the Bosnian Muslim forces travelled into the pocket in the wake of UN relief and humanitarian assistance convoys. This was possible because UNHCR demanded that the Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from the immediate road between Sarajevo and Gorazde in order to assure that there would be no interference with its humanitarian work. Consequently, the flow of Bosnian Muslim military supplies increased to the point that, by the end of April 1993, the Muslim forces had effectively relieved the siege of Gorazde.

As it turned out, the Bosnian Muslims' success was shortlived. For later in the Summer, Bosnian Serb pressure on Sarajevo, as well as on the Gorazde corridor itself, resulted in the resumption of the siege. Nonetheless, for the high command in Sarajevo, the critical lesson of Gorazde was that it was possible to rely on the UN "facilitate" active support to its military operations against the Bosnian Serbs.

Indeed, during 1993, the Bosnian Muslims continued to smuggle items of military importance into Gorazde through UN-related channels. Most important was the delivery of tools, spare parts and even expert personnel to repair the Pobjeda Ammunition Factory and Gorazde's chemical factory. (The latter was reportedly in the process of being converted into a chemical weapons factory.) The assistance for the ammunition factory was "justified" on the grounds that its water storage system was being used as a resource for the city, and that for the chemical factory was "justified" on the basis of the fact that it was capable of producing fertilizers needed for the locally grown crops.

In light of these developments, by the Fall of 1993, the Bosnian Serb High Command in Pale had concluded that it was only a matter of time before the Bosnian Muslims would attempt a military offensive from Gorazde. Since the main military build-up was in the city itself, especially in the eastern part of the enclave, it was assumed that the main thrust of such an offensive would be eastward, in the direction of Serbia.

* * *

The Winter of 1993-94 was harsh in eastern Bosnia, and the shipment of goods into the besieged Muslim pockets, including Gorazde, remained difficult until mid-March. Nevertheless, there were reports of Bosnian Muslim military activity in the Gorazde area as early as the first couple of weeks of February 1994. These reports were given sufficient credence to warrant a decision by Pale to begin moving Bosnian Serb reinforcements into eastern Bosnia. However, even as late as mid-March 1994 most Bosnian Serb forces were still concentrated in central

/...

Bosnia - away from the Gorazde pocket.

In the meantime, in March 1994, there was a significant reorganization of the Bosnian Muslim armed forces in anticipation of the last phase of Sarajevo's preparations for the 1994 Spring/ Summer offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. Sarajevo considered the offensive to be the key to its efforts to draw the West into the Balkan War on the side of the Muslims, and in this connection the battle in Gorazde was be the opening salvo for the offensive.

Indeed, the chain of command of the Bosnian Muslim forces in Gorazde clearly demonstrates the significance that Sarajevo attached to the city. The main Bosnian Muslim unit in Gorazde was the 2nd Brigade (over 2,000 troops), answering directly to the 1st Corps, also known as the East Bosnian Operations Group, in Sarajevo. Sarajevo also deployed to Gorazde a number of Mujahideen and Islamist Commandoes operating under the 1st Tactical Group. In addition, deployed to Gorazde were several Special Forces teams comprised of the best formations of the 'Delta' and 'Laste' units. This entire force was rounded out by units drawn from the local population and organized by the Interior Ministry and was, in turn, augmented by Troops of the Interior Ministry who were highly trained and politically dedicated.

Further, in early April 1994, as the fighting around Gorazde developed into a Bosnian Serb attack on two main axes (south and east) with an additional thrust from the north, the main Muslim forces were reorganized into the 2nd Brigade (eastern approaches) and the 31st Brigade (southern approaches), as well as the Special Forces under centralized command. Later still, a third "Brigade" was established on an *ad hoc* basis to meet the northern thrust. Altogether, the Bosnian Muslims had in Gorazde at the beginning of the siege around 5,000 regular troops and over 5,000 militia and Interior Ministry troops. In addition there was an undetermined number of armed volunteers for the defense of various buildings. Taken together, the Bosnian Muslim command had a total of 12,000 to 15,000 armed men in Gorazde, with 8,000 troops in three organized Brigade-type units.

Against this backdrop, in the first two weeks of March, the Gorazde front was unusually quiet, with Bosnian Muslim forces remaining uncharacteristically passive even as fighting erupted elsewhere in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Yet, even still, there were indications that preparations were being made for major actions in the Gorazde pocket. As before, such preparations would not have been possible without the acquiescence of the UN.

Indeed, there is evidence that humanitarian aid convoys, sanctioned by the UN, assisted in the transfer of equipment and goods to Gorazde. For example, on 14 March, Bosnian Serb inspection teams in the Sokolac heliport discovered an attempt to

smuggle electronic equipment, hard currency and Bosnian Government documents into Gorazde. (Since Gorazde is surrounded, the money may have been intended for use in cross-front line special operations and smuggling.)

* * *

In any case, as of mid March 1994 there was a significant increase in forward reconnaissance patrols by Bosnian Muslim Special Forces. Many of these patrols were armed reconnaissance missions prodding the Bosnian Serb defenses through localized attacks. As it turned out, these attacks on the Bosnian Serb positions were the prelude for a full fledged assault. Thus, on 20 March 1994, the Bosnian Muslims opened artillery fire from the Gorazde pocket on Bosnian Serb positions between Foca and Cajnice, shattering a previously negotiated ceasefire.

Over the next few days there was an escalation in the Bosnian Muslim attacks, including major attacks by infantry assault groupings with fire support from mortars and small calibre automatic guns. By the 25th, the Bosnian Muslim activities had become a major region-wide offensive. As already noted, the main thrust of this offensive was aimed at a gap between Foca and Cajnice, merely 17-18 kms from the center of Gorazde which, if secured, would serve as an ideal invasion route into Montenegro. (Both Belgrade and Pale insist that the strategic aim of the Muslim offensive was to cross the Serb border in order to involve Serbia in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, thus creating a justification for Western military action against Belgrade.)

In any case, the Bosnian Serbs were caught unprepared and it was not until 28 and 29 March that their reinforcements reached the Foca and Cajnice area. By that point, the Bosnian Muslim forces had penetrated 5-7 kms into the Serb lines, a thin Special Forces spearhead reaching as deep as 10 kms. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs deployed their artillery and began shelling the rear area of the Muslim forces, mainly in the southern outskirts of Gorazde along the Drina river. Initially short of ground forces, the Bosnian Serbs were able to block the Muslims' advance with heavy artillery fire. Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb High Command decided to conserve its arriving infantry forces for a counteroffensive, and instead concentrated on inflicting attritions on the Bosnian Muslim units.

Meanwhile, on March 28, sensing that a Bosnian Serb counter-offensive was imminent, Sarajevo began a propaganda campaign focussed on Bosnian Serb artillery attacks against civilians in Gorazde. It was the first time the Bosnian Muslims had raised the issue of the humanitarian situation in Gorazde, and it would, in time, come to represent a pattern.

Subsequently, on 29 March, the Bosnian Serb forces launched a

/...

major counteroffensive on the right bank of the Drina river, between Osanica and Ustipraca in the general direction of Cajnica. The Bosnian Serbs used artillery, tanks, and infantry and soon breached the Muslim lines. Muslim sources claimed that Serb reinforcements were arriving from across the Serb border, but this could not be independently confirmed and both Pale and Zagreb vehemently denied the allegation.

In point of fact, there were troop movements in Montenegro because Belgrade had ordered the reinforcement of its forces in the Montenegro-Bosnia border area. However, there is no independent evidence that any of these forces actually crossed the border into Bosnia, or that they had participated in the fighting in any other form up to that date.

On 30 March, the Bosnian Serbs began their counteroffensive with infantry and tank attacks supported by massive artillery fire from both small calibre automatic guns and howitzers. The main accomplishment of this operation was the containment of the Bosnian Muslim advance. However, soon afterward, the Bosnian Serb forces began themselves moving toward Gorazde along the Praca valley, slowly pushing back the Bosnian Muslim bulge.

Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb reinforcements deployed all around the Gorazde pocket, especially from the north and south-east, and began preparations for a major assault in the hopes of seizing at least one of the main roads leading from east of the Drina River to the Adriatic. For its part, Sarajevo propaganda alleged that sizeable reinforcements from Serbia proper were being deployed for the conduct of this offensive.

In any case, at about the time when it was clear to Sarajevo that its forces would not be able to maintain their offensive, a propaganda blitz about the fate of the civilians in Gorazde began. This campaign was not without effect, for the plight of the civilians in Gorazde, especially the children, rapidly became a major issue in the international media.

Indeed, on 30 March, the US Ambassador to the United Nations Organization, Ms. Madeleine Albright, and Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, arrived in Sarajevo for an unprecedented visit aimed at demonstrating US support for the plight of the Bosnian Muslims. In the aftermath of this visit, President Izetbegovic and his closest aides became convinced that the US Government was determined to ensure a Muslim victory in the war even if that meant American participation in the fighting.

Indeed, it has been reliably reported that the leaders in Sarajevo concluded that what was needed to get America involved in the war on its side was a major traumatic event that would galvanize American public opinion and drive Washington to

intervene militarily in the Balkans. Thus, over the next few weeks, Sarajevo would use the fighting in Gorazde in an attempt to instigate such a US intervention.

In the meantime, on the morning of 31 March, in order to reduce the Bosnian Serb pressure, the Bosnian Muslims attempted a counter-offensive of their own in the direction of Cajnice. Special reinforcements of Bosnian Muslim infantry were rushed overnight to the front to support this action which it was hoped, if successful, would put the Bosnian Muslim forces once more on the short road into Serbia proper.

Sarajevo assumed, correctly as it turned out, that under such circumstances the Bosnian Serbs would divert forces to block the Muslims before they reached the border and crossed into Serbia. For its part, Sarajevo hoped that it would be sufficient for its forces merely to reach, without actually crossing, the border to provoke the Serbian Army to enter the fighting. In the event, the Bosnian Muslim forces failed to breach the Bosnian Serb lines and began to retreat. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs shelled the Bosnian Muslim reinforcements throughout their withdrawal into Gorazde.

Meanwhile, the main Bosnian Serb counteroffensive began on 31st March. Newly arrived forces, still haphazardly organized, began advancing toward the Gorazde pocket from several directions. The Bosnian Serbs used artillery fire both to cover the advance of their infantry and to shell the Muslim rear, including the town itself. Because of the small size of Gorazde, the Bosnian Muslim Army began using the tallest buildings in town, especially the roof of the hospital, as observation posts and command centers for directing their artillery against the advancing Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serb artillery sought to silence these facilities and therefore fired upon the hospital despite the propaganda ramifications that such an action entailed. In any case, by the end of 31 March, the arriving Bosnian Serb forces, although still unorganized, had completed the encirclement of the Gorazde pocket.

On April 1, the better organized Bosnian Serb forces began rolling back the Bosnian Muslim bulge, capturing most of the territory gained in the Muslim offensive. The containment of this offensive convinced Sarajevo that its strategic gambit in the Gorazde area was already doomed from the military point of view. Therefore, Sarajevo shifted its emphasis in this crisis from a mission to secure a strategic-military objective (getting Serbia involved in the Bosnian war) to the more explicitly political-military objective of getting the U.S. involved. Indeed, on 1 April, the Bosnian Prime Minister, Harris Silajdzic, began urging Western/US/UN active intervention against the Bosnian Serbs in order to prevent a "humanitarian tragedy" in Gorazde.

/...

In the meantime, on 2 April, the Bosnian Serb forces continued to push back the Bosnian Muslim bulge. With a growing number of senior officers in the area, the Bosnian Serb forces were becoming better organized and therefore more effective. Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs began gravitating toward two main axes of advance on Gorazde, from the east and from the south.

On 3 and 4 April, the Bosnian Muslims decided to exploit this concentration of the Bosnian Serb forces by trying to disrupt their balance through attacks from other directions. Therefore, a series of hastily organized offensives was launched from inside the Gorazde pocket. The first offensive was westward in the direction of the road to Sarajevo. This maneuver was launched not in the slim hope of breaking the siege, but mainly in order to draw Bosnian Serb forces away from their advance on Gorazde. (It was assumed in Sarajevo that the UN would soon break the siege even though the Bosnian Serbs would not permit humanitarian aid convoys to reach Gorazde.)

The other Muslim offensive moved northward, toward Zepa, in tandem with the Bosnian Serb southward offensive. Here the idea was for the Muslim force to encircle the Bosnian Serb spearhead that had just begun advancing toward the Pobjeda ammunition factory. If successful, the Bosnian Muslim Special Forces would be in a position to hit the Bosnian Serb forces from the flanks and rear. As it was, the Bosnian Muslims committed a force that was too small to accomplish its intended objectives and its success was therefore negligible. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs continued to rush reinforcements of infantry and trucks into what was rapidly escalating into a major battle.

Meanwhile, in late March, on the order of the Sarajevo High Command, Special Forces (reconnaissance-intelligence units) of the East Bosnian Operations Group -- components of the Delta and Laste Special Forces units -- were deployed to Gorazde by infiltrating them on foot through Serb-held territory. Subsequently, the Bosnian Muslim Special Forces in Gorazde were regrouped into detachments, including a mix of both Bosnian Muslims and 'Afghan' Mujahideen.

By the first days of April these forces began operating against the Bosnian Serb columns advancing from the Foca area. In one of their first operations they attacked a convoy of 30 trucks carrying -- according to Sarajevo -- Russian and Romanian mercenaries arriving from Serbia. Meanwhile, the Bosnians continued to blame the Bosnian Serbs for indiscriminately bombing Gorazde.

On April 4, emboldened by the early success of their special operations, Sarajevo decided to use irregular warfare in a strategic attempt to reverse the collapse of the Bosnian Muslim

offensive. Detachments of Bosnian Muslim Special Forces (both Bosnian Muslims and 'Afghan' Mujahideen) advanced from Podkozare, Paljike and Oglecevo in the direction of the Foca-Cajnice salient. Their mission was to attack Bosnian Serb forces in the rear in order to slow their pressure on the remnants of the original bulge. When clashes erupted, the Bosnian Muslim units provided their Special Forces with fire cover from light artillery and mortars. Fierce but localized infantry and artillery clashes ensued and the Special Forces were compelled to withdraw to their start line.

It was only on the night of 4 April that the Muslims finally abandoned their original plan to advance toward Cajnice. That evening they began pulling their forces back from the bulge and into the confines of Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs were slow to exploit this success, as well as reluctant to change the main axis of their own advance which was from the east.

Meanwhile, also on 4 April, the Bosnian Serb forces began advancing westward toward the east bank of the Drina, capturing several villages and turning them into fortified areas. For their part, the Bosnian Muslims evacuated all civilians except for those capable of rendering service to the military and interior ministry forces. In the meantime, the Bosnian Serb forces -- infantry escorted by a few tanks -- continued their slow but steady advance under intense fire support (artillery and MBRL) barrages. At this point the Bosnian Muslim defense lines began to crumble. (The Bosnian Serb assault forces, according to Sarajevo, was composed of 50 tanks. This suggests a reinforcement of under 15 tanks, taking the Serb losses into consideration.)

Despite the active resistance of the Bosnian Muslims all around Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs continued their own renewed offensive on the night of 4 and 5 April. On the road to Sarajevo, the local Bosnian Serb forces were able to contain and then defeat the Bosnian Muslim assault after a brief yet fierce clash. The Bosnian Muslim detachments then withdrew back behind their lines, but the Bosnian Serb forces were too small to give chase and the action was broken off.

In the meantime, in the northern corridor, Bosnian Serb Special Forces began moving against their Muslim counterparts. The Serbs ambushed the Muslims, neutralizing them to some degree, thereby allowing the main Bosnian Serb advance toward the ammunition factory to proceed. Additional reinforcements of tanks, artillery and trucks were rushed by the Bosnian Serbs to support this advance and soon the Serb heavy guns began destroying the Pobjeda factory.

The 5th of April saw fierce infantry clashes on the eastern approaches to Gorazde as the Bosnian Serbs continued breaking through the Bosnian Muslim defense lines. In due course, the High

/...

Command in Sarajevo conceded that the Bosnian Serbs had succeeded in breaching the Bosnian Muslim defense lines to such an extent that the whole front was in danger of collapse. (Most important was the collapse of the Muslim defenses in the villages of Vitkovici and Mravici.)

It was at this point, on 5 April, that Pale began considering exploiting its counteroffensive in order to severely hit the Gorazde pocket, if not destroy it. Bosnian Serb forces could reach at least one of the major strategic highways along the Drina River, and Pale was now convinced that the Muslim offensive was finally crushed. Thus, some of the Bosnian Serb truck-mounted infantry was now diverted from facing the Muslim offensive and was sent to complete a deep encirclement of the Bosnian Muslim front lines. This maneuver brought the Bosnian Serb infantry to the banks of the Drina river and signalled the beginning of yet another advance on Gorazde. By the end of the day the Bosnian Serb forces had reached between 3 and 10 kilometers from the center of Gorazde, arriving from the east and south.

The strategic decisions of Pale were reflected in the final organization of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. Pale now nominated the Chief of Staff, General Manojlo Milovanovic, as the supreme commander of the Gorazde front and immediately ordered the rushing of additional reinforcements to the eastern approaches of Gorazde in order to support and sustain the advance. By now, the Bosnian Serbs had amassed a powerful force in the area with Gen. Radovan Grubac, Commander of the Hercegovina Corps, as the senior field commander.

The Bosnian Serb forces included most of the Hercegovina Corps (which carried the main brunt of the first phase of the fighting), components of the Uzice Corps (that would arrive in early April) and the Sarajevo-Mt.Romanija corps (impacting on the Gorazde pocket from the west but not involved in the main action), as well as Special Forces from the Nis area. At the beginning of the counteroffensive the Bosnian Serbs had around 5,000 high quality troops, and by mid-April this number had reached some 7,000. The Bosnian Serb forces also had a few thousand paramilitary and militia troops, organized in small units, for auxiliary tasks.

Meanwhile, the Bosnian Muslim Special Forces and other elite units began attempting to infiltrate the Bosnian Serb lines from Sarajevo in order to link up with Gorazde. These attempts developed into a hot pursuit operation and involved clashes with Bosnian Serb forces in the mountains surrounding Sarajevo. Subsequently, Sarajevo complained to the UN that the Bosnian Serbs were violating the ceasefire and the NATO ultimatum.

On 6 April, large units of Bosnian Serb forces began their advance from the Cajnice and Foca salient toward the Drina river.

/...

Ultimately, the Serbs came within a half a kilometer of Vitkovici. Meanwhile as the Bosnian Serbs were consolidating their advance through the breaches of the Muslim lines, they brought more artillery pieces -- heavy and automatic small caliber -- to forward positions and began hitting greater parts of Gorazde.

All this time, Bosnian Serb infantry continued to mop up pockets of resistance in the fortified areas captured from the Bosnian Muslim forces. There was extremely bad weather that day, including 10 hours of snowfall, which slowed down activity in the northern approaches to Gorazde. Still, the shelling of Gorazde persisted.

During the night of 6 April and early morning of 7 April, Bosnian Serb forces continued their advance northward. By morning the Serbs had consolidated positions on the banks of the Drina river near Vitkovici, some 4 kilometers from Gorazde itself. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Muslim defense lines in the Oglecevo zone collapsed and the Gorazde command ordered the evacuation of its positions in that area.

Also on 6 April the double character of Sarajevo's depiction of events in Gorazde became clear. On the one hand, Sarajevo was presenting an impression to the Western media that a near defenseless Gorazde, full of civilians and innocents, was on the brink of collapse. On the other hand, the government propaganda depicted for domestic consumption a case of heroic and successful combat by the Muslim troops defending Gorazde against a Serb offensive. While admitting the collapse of certain defense lines, Sarajevo nevertheless stressed that the Muslim defenders were inflicting "heavy losses" on the Serbs.

Significantly, the Sarajevo propaganda also introduced, for the first time, explicit demands that the West intervene militarily to save the city. In fact, Sarajevo introduced the theme of Western intervention because it already knew that the US, UNPROFOR, and NATO, had decided to create in Gorazde circumstances permitting NATO airstrikes within the confines of the existing UN resolutions and guidelines.

Thus, on 7 April, the UN deployed 8 soldiers to Gorazde in order to give itself a legal pretext for its planned airstrikes. (Under the existing UN Resolutions, military action could only be undertaken to defend UN personnel.) Furthermore, the troops deployed by the UN belonged to the British elite SAS who were qualified and specially equipped to call in and direct airstrikes. In other words, UNPROFOR deployed at one stroke both the excuse and the means to deliver airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. In addition, 7 UN liaison officers were also deployed to the Bosnian Muslim forces in Gorazde. No attempt was made to deploy a comparable force of UN liaison officers with the

/...

Bosnian Serbs.

Meanwhile, after hectic negotiations between UNPROFOR, Sarajevo and Pale, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to a ceasefire. On the evening of 6 April, the Bosnian Serbs ceased the shelling. "Gorazde is no longer under attack since 1800 local time," UN spokesman Joe Sills announced. However, the Bosnian Muslims complained that the Bosnian Serb forces were continuing to advance, consolidate and improve their positions virtually until the last moment of the fighting.

Nonetheless, the next day even Radio Sarajevo admitted that the Bosnian Serb shelling of Gorazde had "abated somewhat" even though, the Muslims insisted, the Bosnian Serbs continued to violate the ceasefire. Perhaps unsurprisingly, by nightfall the ceasefire had all but collapsed with both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim forces provoking each other into exchanges of gunfire. At that same time, Sarajevo resumed its propaganda accounts of intense Bosnian Serb shelling and mounting civilian casualties. It was at this point that the saga of the Gorazde hospital began.

The night of 7-8 April saw the first large scale use of Bosnian Serb Special Forces. They crossed the Muslim defense lines from south to east of Gorazde and began attacking the Muslims from the rear. The Serbs created havoc and hastened the collapse of Muslim defense positions in some areas. Later, on 8 April, the Bosnian Serb infantry forces overwhelmed the defenders of Oglecevo after a fierce battle and then proceeded to clear Vitkovici.

On 9 April, the Bosnian Serb forces advancing from the east were finally able to reach and seize a strategic plateau overlooking Gorazde called Mount Gradina. Although there are easy approach routes from there into Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs did not show any inclination to continue into the city itself. Instead, they began to consolidate their position, organize fire observation posts and prepare the area for the arrival of their artillery. Indeed, UNPROFOR concluded that the Bosnian Serbs did not want to take Gorazde and estimated that, in any case, the Serbs were already holding 7.5% of the territory of the original Gorazde pocket.

Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslim Special Forces raided Bosnian Serb positions, instigating a Bosnian Serb shelling of Gorazde. This incident was depicted by the Western media in Sarajevo as an example of Bosnian Serb aggression against innocent civilians in Gorazde. Indeed, special attention was paid to the frequent fire aimed at the hospital -- which was also the main Muslim observation and battle management post -- to drum up support for Western action against the Serbs. Subsequently, the UN and NATO were asked to launch airstrikes in order to protect the UN troops that had been inserted into Gorazde.

/...

It is also noteworthy that on 9 April the Bosnian Serbs agreed to a UNPROFOR initiative to begin ceasefire negotiations in the Sarajevo airport. The Bosnian Muslims refused to attend this meeting.

On 10 April, Bosnian Serb forces continued to advance slowly, mainly consolidating positions and accomplishing tactical improvements. These forces were also able to complete the capture of a few Bosnian Serb villages on the approaches to Gorazde. The Bosnian Serb forces were now only some 6 km from Gorazde and were increasing their effort to advance in the direction of Metvici and the ammunition factory.

At this point, the road was opened for the Bosnian Serbs to capture a major Muslim stronghold in Uhotici Brdo, some 700 m from the Drina, a key to the defense of the southern approaches to Gorazde. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs destroyed the bridge over the Drina at Sadba, complicating any effort to resupply Gorazde. Another bridge, at Bacci, was damaged by Bosnian Serb artillery and Bosnian Serb Special Forces crossed the Drina to the west bank of the river for the first time on 10 April. All this time the shelling of Gorazde itself continued.

The NATO bombing raids, carried out by US fighters, were conducted on 10 and 11 April against Bosnian Serb positions in the Gorazde area. The UK SAS FACs guiding the strike aircraft were within visual range of the intended objectives and the bombings were clearly aimed at stopping the Bosnian Serb advance on Gorazde. Nevertheless, undaunted, the Bosnian Serbs continued their shelling of Gorazde. Sarajevo used the Bosnian Serb defiance to justify the second raid.

Significantly, even though the airstrikes were officially launched in order to protect the lives of the UNPROFOR personnel in Gorazde, there is some evidence of coordination with, or at the least advance knowledge among, the Bosnian Muslim forces that these strikes were coming. For example, Bosnian Serb military intelligence claims that the Muslim forces in Gorazde and Sarajevo were discussing both air raids by radio about four hours before the raids were actually launched. Indeed, Bosnian Muslim Special Forces deployed to advanced positions in the areas to be bombed in order to be ready to exploit the confusion caused to the Serbs by the NATO attacks.

It was at this point that UNPROFOR arranged for another ceasefire on 11 April. At first, the Bosnian Serb artillery honored the ceasefire and UNPROFOR acknowledged that the Bosnian Serbs were holding their fire. However, soon afterward, several Muslim raids were finally answered by the Bosnian Serbs. A clash ensued and quickly escalated into a firefight that included the use of artillery and mortars on both sides. Frustrated and defiant, Pale

announced that it was no longer recognizing Gorazde as a safe zone and proceeded to order the resumption of fighting and shelling.

Thus, on 12 April, the Bosnian Serbs resumed their pressure on Gorazde. At the same time, the Serb infantry was expediting preparations for a major offensive. Indeed, the movement of fresh forces toward, and the regrouping of, the locally deployed forces suggested preparations for a major thrust into the Gorazde pocket. In response, the Bosnian Muslim forces attempted a localized counterattack southward along the Drina river but were contained by the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Muslims also opened artillery and mortar fire from inside Gorazde. Exchanges of fire ensued and reports of civilian casualties inside Gorazde increased.

Meanwhile, deep raids by Bosnian Serb Special Forces continued to increase both in number and in the depth of their penetration. A major byproduct of these Serb efforts was that Gorazde had to divert several of its own Special Forces to hunt their Bosnian Serb counterparts inside the Muslim held area rather than raid behind the Bosnian Serb lines. The aggregate impact of the continued Bosnian Serb shelling and special operations brought Gorazde near to collapse.

Thus, by 13 April, the fighting near Gorazde had become completely politicized with a fundamental difference between the objectives of UNPROFOR and those of the Bosnian Government becoming manifest. The UN was determined to arrange a ceasefire so that the killing of civilians inside Gorazde would be stopped. By contrast, Sarajevo, with massive support from the US, was adamant on reversing its military defeat -- itself a result of the failure of the Bosnian Muslims' own offensive -- through "diplomatic processes," namely, international pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, it was in Sarajevo's own interest to ensure that the ceasefires collapsed as that would increase the pressure on the Serbs to withdraw and on the West to launch military action against the Serbs.

Indeed, a cyclic routine aimed at instigating a major Western intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims now developed in Gorazde. It went as follows: At first, the Bosnian Serbs declared a unilateral ceasefire, negotiating details with UNPROFOR. The Serb forces would then cease fire - more or less, given their endemic problems with command control over the various militias. Then the Bosnian Muslims would provoke the Bosnian Serbs with mortar attacks, special raids, etc. Within a short time the Bosnian Serb forces would respond, sending a massive barrage into Gorazde. In due course, the Western media would then report unprovoked Bosnian Serb shelling of the civilian population, which would then prompt the US/UN/NATO to threaten military action. The Bosnian Serbs would then agree to declare a new

/...

unilateral ceasefire and the whole cycle would begin again.

At least initially, UNPROFOR seemed to recognize this pattern. For example, Gen. Rose, the UN ground commander, asked the Muslims "to stop their provocations in Gorazde." Indeed, in an interview with French TV (TF-1) on April 12, Gen. Rose acknowledged that the Muslims "shoot on the Serbs to step up the pressure and to obtain a fresh intervention from NATO."

Nevertheless, faced with repeated threats of airstrikes, as well as intense NATO air activities around Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb High Command in Pale ordered that NATO aircraft involved in such activities be considered as legitimate targets. By now, the NATO aircraft, mainly US strike aircraft, were repeatedly conducting "dry runs," that is simulated strikes, aimed at deterring and stopping Bosnian Serb troop movements. Since no ordnance was actually dropped, such "maneuvers" were permitted by the "letter" of the UN/NATO mandate, although their clear objective to harass the Bosnian Serbs was stretching it a bit.

Against this backdrop, on 13 April, fighting around Gorazde was limited to localized infantry clashes, mainly attempts by both sides to make tactical adjustments and prevent the other side from doing the same. In this context, the Bosnian Serb shelling of Gorazde was limited to brief but intense responses to Muslim provocations. However, on 14 April, there was a major escalation of the Bosnian Muslim provocation effort, as well as in the Bosnian Serb response to it, that was both militarily futile and politically disastrous.

What transpired went as follows: The Bosnian Muslim forces, including a majority of their mortars and artillery, were concentrated next to the facilities of the Red Cross - a clearly marked building in the center of Gorazde. When the Muslim infantry launched a series of coordinated localized attacks on the Bosnian Serb forces advancing northward on both banks of the Drina river, infantry fighting and clashes soon expanded along the entire front line east of Gorazde. All this time, the attacking Bosnian Muslim infantry were provided with intense fire support from the mortars and small calibre automatic guns deployed in the immediate vicinity of the Red Cross building.

Needless to say, it did not take long for the Bosnian Serbs to react to this action. In due course, the Bosnian Serb infantry, with direct fire support from tanks and small caliber guns, after hours of intense fighting, were able to block and reverse the Bosnian Muslim attacks. Indeed, in some sectors, the local Bosnian Serb commanders exploited the collapse of the Bosnian Muslim attacks to make local advances with their own forces, tightening the siege on Gorazde. An outgrowth of this was the link-up of all Bosnian Serb forces advancing from the south and southeast so that a unified thrust was formed.

/...

Once that was done, the Bosnian Serbs directed their attention to the source of the long-range fire being aimed at them from the area of the Red Cross building. Thus, Bosnian Serb artillery began intense counter-battery fire into the concentration of Bosnian Muslim fire, hitting the Red Cross building in the process. Other Bosnian Serb guns shelled Gorazde itself.

The moment Bosnian Serb shells began falling in the vicinity of the Red Cross building, the Muslim propaganda machine went into action. "Ham radio" reports out of Goradze began giving accounts of intentional Bosnian Serb shelling of the hospital and the Red Cross building. These reports came in addition to the regular reports of heavy casualties among the civilian population. Needless to say, Sarajevo capitalized on these reports to coax the UN/NATO into taking further military action against the Bosnian Serb forces.

On 15 April, realizing that the fighting in the Gorazde area was only going to escalate, Pale ordered the Bosnian Serb forces to resume their advance on the city. The primary objective was to establish Bosnian Serb control over the eastern bank of the Drina so that at least one of the highways to the Adriatic would remain under Bosnian Serb control. Consequently, the Bosnian Serb forces advancing from the east resumed their attack.

By the end of the next day (16 April) the Serbs had completed the capture of two strategic peaks -- Gradina and Jartiste -- located some 5 km east of Gorazde. This area was the launching place for the main Bosnian Muslim offensive in the direction of Cajnice and also benefited from the fact that it was an ideal site for launching long range artillery fire.

In mid April, with Gorazde seemingly on the verge of collapse, NATO air operations and related military activities intensified. The British SAS teams significantly expanded the zone of their infiltration activities in order to identify, locate and mark Bosnian Serb targets for subsequent air attacks. On 15 April, one team operating in the Jabuka Sedlo mountain pass deep inside Bosnian Serb territory clashed with a local Bosnian Serb unit. One of the SAS troops was killed and another wounded in the ensuing firefight.

Meanwhile, NATO aircraft also expanded their reconnaissance and simulated strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in the Gorazde area as the Bosnian Serbs, in turn, continued firing on NATO aircraft. On 15 April, the Bosnian Serbs hit a French Super Etendard IV-P on a reconnaissance mission. On 16 April, a Sea Harrier from the British aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal was shot down as it was attempting, along with several US A-10s, to strike (still conducting preparatory dry runs) Serb positions. The Sea Harrier was shot down with an SA-7, and the pilot bailed out safely and

/...

landed inside Gorazde.

Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs denied shooting down the British warplane. Indeed, the Bosnian Serb High Command insists that Muslim forces shot down the Sea Harrier. They point out that the aircraft was hit over Gorazde itself and that the pilot landed in the middle of the Muslim area. Furthermore, Bosnian Serb military intelligence claims to have intercepted a message from the High Command in Gorazde to the General Staff in Sarajevo informing them of the successful completion of the order to shoot down a NATO plane.

Whatever the truth of the matter was, soon afterward several US and UK planes launched simulated bombing and strafing runs over the Bosnian Serb forces around Gorazde that were so realistic that even the UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo first described them as actual bombing raids in retaliation for the downing of the Sea Harrier. It was only a few hours later that UNPROFPR rushed to deny its own announcement, stressing that no ordnance was actually dropped in the course of these airstrikes.

Meanwhile, UN observers were randomly deployed in the forward Bosnian Muslim positions, at times only 500 meters from the front line, without any advance warning to the Bosnian Serb side. Consequently, UNPROFOR personnel would suddenly appear in a Bosnian Muslim position in the middle of a firefight demanding that the Bosnian Serbs hold their fire or else risk NATO airstrikes. In other cases, the Muslims simulated a bogus UNPROFOR presence, trying to affect a unilateral Bosnian Serb cessation of fire the moment things went bad for themselves.

Against this backdrop, around 15 April, Sarajevo's propaganda campaign began to significantly intensify. The leaders of Sarajevo began complaining to the world media that the UN was not protecting the innocent in Gorazde -- overlooking the fact that such action was never contemplated in the UN mandate -- and began urging resolute armed intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, reports of atrocities in Gorazde continued to flow in along with calls for help from the city.

In the meantime, the Bosnian Serbs were firmly holding all the strategic points surrounding Gorazde and their forces were ready to launch an advance into the city proper if instructed to do so. However, at this point, the Bosnian Serb leadership was still against such a move. Instead, the local Serb forces were instructed to send in patrols to map and test the defenses of Gorazde.

Some of these Bosnian Serb patrols, usually comprising an infantry platoon with 1 or 2 tanks, were able to enter the city itself, though they normally withdrew after a short time. In addition, Bosnian Serb Special Forces deployed in the immediate

vicinity of the town, directing sniperfire at Bosnian Muslim military personnel in order to prevent the Muslims from directing their forces. Even though the highest levels at Pale repeatedly assured the UN that they had no intention of seizing Gorazde, the Sarajevo propaganda machine continued to warn of the imminent fall of the city.

In this context, on 17 April, in a passionate speech on Radio Sarajevo, Izetbegovic called on the defenders of Gorazde to hold out despite the intense casualties they were suffering. At the same time the Bosnian government continued to urge the West/US/UN/NATO to launch airstrikes on the Bosnian Serbs near Gorazde.

Meanwhile, by about this time, the Bosnian Serbs had developed a routine for dealing with the Gorazde situation militarily. The Bosnian Serb forces would conduct a combination of sporadic shelling and prodding patrols in and out of Gorazde, at times getting close to center of the city in order to demonstrate their ability to take it at will. These operations were augmented in raids by the Bosnian Serb Special Forces that would be undertaken during the night. The aggregate impact of such tactics proved highly effective at increasing the level of tension among the Muslim forces in Gorazde while requiring only minimal effort by the Bosnian Serbs themselves. The Bosnian Serbs also concentrated on better dispersing and camouflaging their equipment in view of the intensifying NATO air reconnaissance and simulated strikes.

Then, on 17 April, pursuant to their own unilateral ceasefire, the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their main tanks and guns to a distance of 3 kms from the hospital area. The Bosnian Muslim forces exploited the absence of the heavy guns and opened fire on the Bosnian Serb positions, and in two strategic sectors -- the approaches to Ustiprica and Kopaci -- tried to launch infantry attacks to seize the Bosnian Serb positions. The Bosnian Serbs responded by shelling and deploying tanks back to their positions, effectively negating their promise of a ceasefire and unilateral disengagement.

However, in the aftermath of one Bosnian Muslim infantry attack, the Bosnian Serbs counterattacked and seized strategically located Biserna Hill, thus assuring their control over the entire east bank of the Drina all the way to the approaches to Gorazde itself. The forward Bosnian Serb units established positions virtually inside Gorazde, while in the north the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces toward Kopaci was reversed and the tanks and infantry stormed the Bosnian Muslim positions, penetrating deeply through their defensive lines.

With the Bosnian Muslims complaining of ammunition shortages, the Bosnian Serbs insisted on thorough inspection of humanitarian convoys before they were allowed to go to Gorazde through the

/...

Bosnian Serb lines. Considering that the UN had been instrumental in building the Bosnian Muslim forces in Gorazde, it was not an illogical demand. However, Sarajevo would hear nothing of it, stressing that it would not permit convoys "to be tampered with" by the Bosnian Serbs to enter Gorazde. An impasse developed and the Bosnian propaganda machine intensified its outcries of a humanitarian disaster in Gorazde, citing huge numbers of wounded and fatalities.

Meanwhile, on 18 April, Karadzic promised to implement yet another unilateral ceasefire and withdraw some of his heavy weapons 3 kms away from the outskirts of Gorazde as the first phase of a regional ceasefire. Once again, soon after the Bosnian Serb withdrawal began, the Bosnian Muslim forces opened fire on the Bosnian Serb positions, and again the Bosnian Serbs turned around and resumed their shelling.

Also on 18 April, the Bosnian Muslims established a new long-range fire position in a five story building that had been used previously by UNPROFOR observers. Indeed, the UN was still using the 5th floor facility while the Bosnian Muslims fortified the 3rd and 4th floors. (The Bosnian Muslims established fire positions for heavy machine guns on the 4th floor, and for automatic small caliber guns on the 3rd. Ultimately, the Bosnian Muslims would even go so far as to establish a fire control and command post on the 5th floor.) Firing from this building enabled the Bosnian Muslims to extend the range of their weapons. Not surprisingly, it was not long before the Bosnian Serbs were accused of deliberately attacking a UN facility.

Beginning on 19 April, the overall situation was further complicated when the Bosnian Serbs yet again tried to implement a unilateral ceasefire and withdraw 3 kms from the center of Gorazde. Under extreme pressure from Pale, the local Bosnian Serb commanders finally restrained their forces, gradually reducing the level and intensity of their operations.

In this connection, a problem developed regarding the locally recruited Bosnian Serb militias. Many of the troops in these militias had been recruited from Gorazde and nearby villages that had been overrun by Muslim forces in 1992. Now returning to their destroyed villages, these troops were supposed to serve as a home guard and police force for the Bosnian Serbian rear. However, with the main Bosnian Serb forces being withdrawn, these militiamen suddenly found themselves at the front where, needless to say, they could not resist firing (mainly small arms) at their Muslim adversaries.

These Serb militia were the source of numerous ceasefire violations from the Bosnian Serb side as the Serb commanders had difficulty controlling and restraining them. Thus, these militiamen turned into a serious political problem for the

Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, the Pale command should have known better than to deploying such units to the front, but senior officials in Pale insisted that they had no choice.

In the meantime, on 20 April, Pale reiterated the Bosnian Serb commitment to the conditions of the unilateral ceasefire and partial withdrawal, and agreed to the deployment of 100 UNPROFOR personnel to observe the ceasefire. Nonetheless, reacting to reports of widespread civilian casualties and damage, NATO "considered in a favorable light" the request by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, for wider airstrikes to protect not just Sarajevo and Gorazde, but all six "safe areas" declared by the UN.

In the meantime, on 20 April, the Bosnian Serbs continued to have difficulties implementing their ceasefire due to Bosnian Muslim provocations and their own uncontrollable militiamen. The Bosnian Muslim forces fired intense but brief barrages from their positions in the UN building, near the Red Cross building, and similar sites, instigating the inevitable Bosnian Serb reaction. At this time Sarajevo propaganda described the Bosnian Serb withdrawals as the massing of Serb forces for a final assault on Gorazde.

The reports of an all out Bosnian Serb offensive continued on 21 April, with the Bosnian Muslims reporting an avalanche of tanks closing in on Gorazde. Sarajevo even insisted that surface to surface missiles had been fired from inside Serbia into Gorazde. Nevertheless, on the basis of political discussions with the US and the West, Sarajevo was confident that NATO was about to bomb the Bosnian Serbs yet once more.

Indeed, at the point when they expected further NATO action, Muslim infantry assembled near the bridges in Gorazde and other protected forward positions, ready to launch an attack that would exploit the NATO bombings. When the Bosnian Muslims opened fire on the northern front, the Bosnian Serbs capitalized on this and launched an attack in the direction of the Pobjeda ammunition factory - concentrating their artillery fire at the facility in order to cause maximum damage before their forces were compelled to withdraw beyond firing range.

By 22 April, the Bosnian Muslim military and propaganda strategy seemed to have worked, especially since the Bosnian Serbs could not hold their fire long enough for their efforts at self-restraint to be verified. Consequently, NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, warning them that they would be subjected to intense bombing if they did not implement their unilateral plan for a ceasefire.

Thus, NATO demanded that all hostilities against Gorazde were to cease immediately. The Bosnian Serb forces were to pull back 3

/...

kms from the center of Gorazde, while pulling their heavy weapons back 20 kms. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs were to permit UN and other humanitarian convoys to travel into and out of Gorazde as well as allow the evacuation of the wounded.

At the same time, Muslim propaganda intensified as the Bosnian Serbs geared up to comply with the NATO ultimatum. Furthermore, Washington was encouraged to expand NATO military intervention on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, prompting Defence Secretary William Perry to say that the US wanted NATO warplanes to launch "vigorous raids" against Bosnian Serb targets if the Bosnian Serbs did not stop shelling the Muslim safe havens. Ultimately, by late evening of the next day, April 23, with the first UN convoy about to arrive, Sarajevo acknowledged that Bosnian Serb fire had "diminished" though it was not yet completely stopped.

Thus, on 24 April, UNPROFOR units began deploying along the demarcation line between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb forces. The UN confirmed that the Bosnian Serb forces had completed their withdrawal beyond the 3 km line, and a UNPROFOR team began assessing the damage and preparing for the evacuation of thousands of wounded civilians. For their part, the Bosnian Muslims deployed Special Forces into the hills and began ambushing the withdrawing Bosnian Serb forces. In response, the Bosnian Serbs began blowing up those facilities that they considered possible launching sites for such ambushes.

However, before withdrawing, the Bosnian Serbs also blew up segments of the Pobjeda ammunition factory as well as the water pumping and cooling system for the high explosives production line. As long as the ammunition factory was not working, the besieged pocket had used water from this system for drinking, cooking and bathing. Thus, the Western media inaccurately described the Bosnian Serb action as the intentional blowing up of the water system of Gorazde.

In the meantime, due to the mountainous terrain and Muslim attacks, the Bosnian Serb withdrawal was progressing slowly, prompting NATO to request permission to launch airstrikes on the withdrawing Bosnian Serb forces. UN representative Akashi vetoed the request, stressing that the Bosnian Serbs were doing their best to comply with the UN conditions.

Indeed, on 26 April, UNPROFOR expressed its satisfaction with the Bosnian Serb compliance of the withdrawal from the Gorazde area. Still Sarajevo continued to insist that the Bosnian Serbs were violating the agreement and to demand NATO aerial bombing. Meanwhile, ambushes by Bosnian Muslim Special Forces, as well as sporadic artillery and mortar fire, continued -- all in an effort to provoke a Bosnian Serb response.

On the evening of 26 April, UNPROFOR confirmed the successful

/...

completion of the pull back of the Bosnian Serb forces. The next day, UNPROFOR teams began searching the exclusion zone for concealed Bosnian Serb forces and weapons, but none were found. Nevertheless, Harris Silajdzic continued to insist that Bosnian Serb infantry forces were in Gorazde and to demand that NATO bomb them.

* * *

That said, it was now possible to objectively asses the actual situation in Gorazde. It soon became clear that the Bosnian Muslims had overstated the plight of the city. The casualty levels were far below initial reports, with UNHCR, the most responsible among these reporting sources, having initially alleged that there were 715 killed and 1970 wounded, over 600 of them serious and requiring evacuation by air. Most of these casualties, the UNHCR had stressed, were innocent civilians. However, post action inspection revealed that there were some 200 fatalities and some 200 seriously wounded, 70% of them Muslim soldiers.

The extent of the damage to the hospital and other buildings, not to speak of Gorazde overall, was far below what had been anticipated on the basis of radio reports. Indeed, on 28 April, General Rose went on an inspection tour of the Gorazde enclave. He returned full of criticism of the Bosnian Muslims, adding that they had exaggerated the number of wounded and the damage done to the town in the Bosnian Serb offensive in order to instigate NATO's military intervention. General Rose stated: "The situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe. One can only be pleased at that. There was obviously damage to the town and you can't fight a battle around a town without there being damage to the town. But the town had not been destroyed to the level which I had expected."

In Sarajevo, a senior UN officer who visited Gorazde was more explicit: "Reports of Gorazde were deliberately exaggerated in order to shame the world into doing something," he told The New York Times. "The attacks were not of the dimension suggested. A false impression was given to the international community to help stir the vision of the Bosnian Serbs as the enemy and, unfortunately, all this very nearly went out of control."

The UN officer went on to warn that Gorazde would not be the last case of Sarajevo's exploitation of a military engagement to involve the West in the fighting. "The big problem is that the Muslims believe they can bring the Americans into the war," the officer said. "A dangerous overreaction was stirred up in international capitals. The talk of wider use of NATO airpower, hitting ammunition dumps and infrastructure went well across the line that would have turned the UN forces here into combatants."

/...

Unfortunately, the warnings of this senior UN officer appear to have been all too accurate. Immediately after the publication of his remarks, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright lodged a strong complaint with the UN Secretary-General in which the United States Government accused "in the strongest possible terms" top UN officials in the Balkans of, in the words of The New York Times, "failing to support a more aggressive policy toward the Serbs" in Bosnia. Washington, it seems, has not yet learned the lessons of the battle of Gorazde.

by Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/747
23 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 JUNE 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a table showing the 2,402 miscellaneous bombs, shells and missiles, ordnance left behind by the 30-Power aggression against Iraq, that were found and dealt with in all parts of Iraq in the period 1-31 May 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASSAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Monthly bomb-disposal statement, 1-31 May 1994

No.	Civil defence department	Number and type of ordnance disposed of
1	Basra	144 cluster bombs 42 spherical bombs 1 mortar shell 20 artillery shells 100 anti-personnel mines 10 RPG-7 rockets
2	Babil	Russian-made assault hand-grenade
3	Anbar	300 cluster bombs
4	Qadisiyah	1 anti-personnel hand-grenade
5	Najaf	2 assault hand-grenades
6	Dhi Qar	106-mm artillery shells
7	Wasit	3 anti-personnel mines
8	Muthanna	117 85-mm mortar shells
9	Ta'mim	RPG-7 rocket
10	Maysan	Anti-personnel mines
11	Rusafah	1,444 anti-personnel mines 2 assault hand-grenades 15 detonators 1 106-mm tail unit
12	Ninawa	8 spherical cluster bombs
13	Karkh	1 firework

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/748
24 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 23 JUNE 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic issued on 22 June 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement dated 22 June 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan

In connection with the statement issued on 18 June 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been authorized to point out that the allegations in that statement are inconsistent with the facts.

The Ministry also considers it useful to draw attention to the latest developments related to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict:

Armenia has refused to sign the Agreement on the Strengthening of the Cease-fire Regime of 16 May 1994, as proposed by Mr. Jan Eliasson, the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference;

On 13 June 1994, the Armenian delegation refused to take part in consultations mediated by the Russian Federation;

On 12 June 1994, the Armenian armed forces, using a company supported by armoured vehicles, attempted an offensive in the vicinity of Oriouktash Hill a great distance from the Nagorny Karabakh district of the Azerbaijani Republic. The aim was to breach defensive positions of units of the Azerbaijani armed forces;

On 17 June 1994, units of the Armenian armed forces fired artillery shells at the settlement of Kegnakyshlak, as well as at population centres in the Sharur district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan;

On 19 June 1994, units of the Armenian armed forces launched missile attacks against the Sadarak district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan;

On 20 June 1994, units of the Armenian armed forces used artillery and rifles in concentrated shelling of the Sadarak district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as positions of units of the Azerbaijani armed forces in the region of the Bashkend Pass;

On 21 June 1994, units of the Armenian armed forces shelled the village of Munjuglu and several population centres in the Tauz district a great distance from the Nagorny Karabakh district of the Azerbaijani Republic, as well as positions of units of the Azerbaijani armed forces in the region of the Bashkend Pass.

The conclusion from the foregoing is that Armenia, having embarked on a policy of frustrating any negotiations, is deliberately provoking violations of the cease-fire and a further escalation in hostilities.

The world community has repeatedly witnessed propaganda campaigns to camouflage the policy of aggression which the Armenian leadership has been conducting against the Azerbaijani Republic for several years.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic stresses that further escalation of aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan is unacceptable. It calls on all the decision makers to demonstrate goodwill and a commitment to peace and to condemn such actions.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/749
26 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In reference to Security Council resolution 917 (1994) concerning the institution of an embargo on the Republic of Haiti, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Lebanon has been duly informed of this decision by the Council and will enforce it in accordance with the provisions of the said resolution.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-26436 (E) 270694

270694

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/750
24 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex

Seventh report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the seventh on the activities of the Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. It is the sixth such report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991). It covers the period from 15 December 1993 to 17 June 1994 and is further to the reports contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and Corr.1, S/24984, S/25977 and S/26910.

2. Building on the Commission's recommendation, contained in paragraph 38 of S/26910, to consolidate its reporting obligations under resolutions 699 (1991) and 715 (1991), this shall be the last report in this series. This recommendation was made as the Commission's work now focuses essentially on ongoing monitoring and verification activities and hence, if the previous reporting sequence were maintained, there would be considerable duplication. A consolidated reporting approach would provide the Security Council with a more concise, comprehensive and continuous written account of all the activities of the Commission on a biannual basis. Unless the Council requests otherwise, a further report under resolution 715 (1991) will be submitted in October 1994 and thereafter consolidated reports under both resolutions will be submitted each February and August. Oral reporting will continue on a monthly basis, as requested by the Council, and special written reports will be submitted as circumstances dictate.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

3. Since the last report, there have been no further changes in the composition of the Special Commission. The Commission held its seventh plenary session from 10 to 12 May 1994. This was followed by meetings of the Commission's working groups on Chemical Weapons and Ongoing Monitoring and Verification.

4. Currently there are 41 staff in the Office of the Executive Chairman, 23 in the Bahrain Field Office, and 69 in the Baghdad Field Office.

5. There is still no agreement on the sale of Iraqi oil to finance United Nations operations resulting from the cease-fire resolution. Current expenses have been met from voluntary contributions from Member States and funds made available from frozen Iraqi assets in accordance with Security Council resolution 778 (1992). However, in the absence of Iraqi agreement to sell oil, of Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 699 (1991) to meet

the full costs of the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991) and of an appropriate mechanism for this purpose, the problem of the financing of the Commission's operations remains a matter of great concern. Further cash contributions by Governments are thus urgently required.

6. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Special Commission through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment. Further information on financial and organizational issues can be found in appendix I to the present report.

III. STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

7. The status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the relevant agreements and Council resolutions and decisions.

8. The Commission and IAEA on the one hand and the Government of Bahrain on the other have extended for a further six months, until 30 September 1994, the agreement provided for in the exchange of letters relating to the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and IAEA in Bahrain.

9. In Iraq, there were fewer problems in the implementation of the Commission's status, privileges and immunities and with the security of Commission personnel and property. Such problems that there were, were minor in comparison with earlier experiences, with two exceptions: an incident in which an Iraqi fired on an UNSCOM vehicle convoy in January 1994 and another in April 1994 in which a crowd stoned an UNSCOM helicopter while it was undertaking a medical evacuation of two members of the United Nations Guard contingent. Iraq is extending to current inspection teams all the support and assistance requested by them.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS

A. Political developments

10. Iraq's acceptance on 26 November 1993 of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved thereunder opened the way for the implementation of the plans, the first stage of which is to establish the baseline data for ongoing monitoring and verification. Immediately upon Iraq's acceptance, the Commission informed Iraq that the latter's earlier reports about its dual-purpose capabilities were inadequate in the light of the requirements of resolution 715 (1991) and so full initial declarations made in conformity with these requirements should be submitted to the Commission. Initial declarations were received in mid-January 1994.

11. On the basis of Iraq's declarations and further information provided by Iraq in response to the Commission's requests for supplementary information, as well as information available to the Commission from other sources (most notably

the results of its own inspections) and analysis, the Commission then updated its lists of sites, equipment and materials to be monitored under the Commission's plan. The Commission is now in the process of conducting baseline inspections of each of the sites on the list, the end result of which will be monitoring and verification protocols for each site. In parallel, sensors and tags and seals are being installed in line with decisions made on the basis of the recommendations of baseline inspection teams. Iraq has publicly committed itself to cooperate with the Commission and IAEA in this endeavour and the teams are receiving the support and assistance they request of their Iraqi counterparts. This is a welcome change in Iraq's attitude.

12. The political dialogue initiated as part of the resolution of the camera crisis in July 1993 has also continued. High-level meetings were held in New York in March and May 1994, in Baghdad in February and April 1994 and in Amman in May 1994. A further round is scheduled in Baghdad for July 1994.

13. During an earlier such meeting held in New York in November 1993, technical talks on chemical weapons were held in which the Commission suggested to Iraq that, in order to address concerns about the vagueness of Iraq's account of its imports for its chemical weapons programme, Iraq should conduct brainstorming seminars with the officials involved in the programme to see whether collectively they could improve on the precision and completeness of the data. Iraq agreed to pursue the idea, the results of which were received and further explored in subsequent contacts during the period from February to April 1994.

14. During the February round of talks, there were some technical discussions, but the major element was the joint statement released by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, and the Executive Chairman at the end of the meeting. That statement, which called for the expediting of the inspection process and in which Iraq stated that it would welcome inspection teams and facilitate their tasks, reflected the increasingly amenable attitude being adopted by the Iraqi authorities in their dealings with the Commission.

15. However, this trend, on the political level, recorded a severe reverse in the March talks. Mr. Aziz accused the Commission and the Executive Chairman of acting for political motives not related to the mandate and directly under the influence of one Member State. He stated that Iraq had lost confidence in the Commission and saw little reason to continue cooperating with it if the Commission would not set a date for the lifting of the oil embargo. Indeed, he threatened that cooperation would be withdrawn if no date were set. The meeting broke up with no date set for a further round of high-level talks. Meanwhile, no change was noted in the level of support and assistance being proffered to inspection teams on the ground.

16. In the second week of April, Iraq requested a further round of high-level talks, citing "important developments" since the previous round. The atmosphere of this round of talks was in marked contrast with the March talks. The result was a further joint statement, in which Iraq publicly committed itself to continue to cooperate with the Commission and IAEA in the conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification and to respect their rights and privileges throughout this stage of their work. This was welcomed by the Commission and IAEA, continued cooperation and respect of their rights and privileges after the

lifting of the oil embargo being the prime concern as to whether they would be able to conduct effective ongoing monitoring and verification.

17. These positive trends were confirmed in the May meetings held in New York and Amman. In addition, at the Amman talks, the Commission and IAEA responded to questions raised by Iraq on the proposed export/import monitoring mechanism required under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991).

B. Operational developments

18. The period under review has seen the most intense inspection activity in the Commission's history. Across the board, with Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), activities have focused more on establishing the system of ongoing monitoring and verification than on searching for or destroying weapons capabilities. This process is under way in the form of: efforts to establish the baseline data required for initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification; analysis of Iraqi declarations; and the conduct of inspections at declared and designated sites. In New York, much effort has been devoted to the compilation of site folders which, upon completion of the baseline process, will evolve into monitoring and verification protocols for each site to be monitored.

19. In the chemical weapons area, the activities of the Chemical Destruction Group at Muthanna were concluded on 14 June 1994. This brought to a successful conclusion a unique multinational undertaking, fulfilling the Commission's mandate to eliminate Iraq's declared chemical weapons stockpile and doing so expeditiously, at minimal expense, and with no damage to the environment. This was a two-year operation, involving some 100 experts, in the course of which the following were destroyed: over 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents (including mustard agent and the nerve agents sarin and tabun); over 28,000 chemical munitions (involving 8 types of munitions ranging from rockets to artillery shells, bombs and ballistic missile warheads); and nearly 1,800,000 litres, over 1,040,000 kilograms and 648 barrels of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents. The Commission wishes to pay special tribute to the international experts and Iraqi personnel who brought this operation to such a successful conclusion in the harshest of environments.

20. The other main focus of effort in the chemical weapons area lay in pressuring Iraq to provide further information on its chemical weapons programme. This pressure continues to pay off: Iraq's most recent account of its past chemical weapons production is much fuller than earlier versions and, for the first time, is supported by a list of letters of credit issued for the import of equipment and materials purchased for the programme. This should allow the Commission, with the assistance of Governments, to verify large parts of Iraq's explanation of its chemical weapons programme. In addition, the first in a series of baseline inspections has been conducted, resulting in the preparation of monitoring and verification protocols for 15 sites. Detailed accounts of inspection and destruction activities can be found in appendices II and III respectively.

21. Further biological inspections were conducted as part of the baseline inspection process. One team visited over 30 sites, obtaining much information needed to design ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area. A second inspection team inventoried and tagged dual-purpose biological equipment, particularly equipment related to production. Talks were also held to clarify certain issues in the biological area.

22. On ballistic missiles, efforts have concentrated on three main aspects: trying to establish a definitive material balance for SCUD-type missiles and other prohibited items; conducting baseline inspections of Iraq's dedicated and supporting missile plants and dual-capable facilities; and tagging relevant equipment and missiles (see appendix II).

23. Aerial surveillance activities have continued apace, using both U-2 and helicopter platforms. The U-2 continues to be used both in survey mode and to provide detailed photography of sites in preparation for ground inspections. Helicopter missions continue to be flown in support of ground inspections and to provide a time-series photographic record of sites which will need monitoring under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

C. Iraq's declarations

24. Since its acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), Iraq has sought to address the Commission's concerns on the provision of data, both in relation to the full, final and complete disclosures and in relation to the declarations of current and recent dual-purpose capabilities due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. There remains some doubt, however, that Iraq is fully cooperating in this regard, particularly as it maintains its claim to have destroyed all documentation and not to be able to recall certain key facts. The lack of documentation continues to present the Commission with the problem of how to verify Iraq's account of its programmes and with the problem of what confidence it can have that it has fully accounted for Iraq's banned capabilities. In this regard, the lack of documentation has been one of the principal delaying factors. That said, there has been a marked change for the better in Iraq's willingness to address the Commission's concerns, particularly in relation to current dual-purpose facilities.

25. A more detailed description of developments in this regard is to be found in the relevant sections of appendix II.

D. Export/import monitoring mechanism

26. By paragraph 7 of its resolution 715 (1991), the Security Council requested "the Security Council Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) ... the Special Commission and the Director General of [IAEA] to develop in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder".

27. A draft proposal for an export/import monitoring mechanism was prepared by the Office of the Special Commission in consultation with the IAEA Action Team. The agreed text was then submitted on 13 May 1994 to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) (i.e., the Sanctions Committee). At the time of writing, it is expected that the Sanctions Committee will take action in the near future on the proposal and submit it to the Security Council for adoption in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

28. The proposal envisages a system of timely notification, rather than licensing, of exports from States and imports into Iraq of items which are covered in the annexes to the Commission and IAEA plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Iraq, both as importer and the exporting State, will be required to give advance notice of its acquisition of items covered by the plans. A principal consideration in designing the proposal has been the need for a mechanism robust enough to deter Iraq from potential breaches. Nevertheless, to be workable, the mechanism must also be sufficiently simple so as not to place an undue reporting burden on Governments. The mechanism will be buttressed by the ability of the Commission and IAEA to conduct unlimited inspections throughout Iraq.

V. ISSUES AND PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE

29. The situation is very different, generally for the better, from that which obtained at the time of the last report. Iraq has accepted resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. It has provided the Commission much new information about both its past programmes and its dual-purpose facilities. It is committed publicly to cooperate with the Special Commission and IAEA in the implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification and to respect their rights and privileges in doing so. Inspection teams are no longer subjected routinely to obstruction or intimidation, rather as a rule receiving the support and assistance they request from their Iraqi counterparts.

30. However, work remains to be done. In order for the Commission to be able to report to the Council that the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions have been fulfilled, it must be able to answer two questions in the affirmative:

- Is the Commission confident that it has accounted for and eliminated all of Iraq's banned capabilities?

- Is the Commission confident that it has an effective ongoing monitoring and verification system in place and operational, i.e., one that could deter or detect in time a clandestine attempt to reactivate the banned programmes?

31. Further work still needs to be done to clarify outstanding issues in relation to the past programmes. The speed with which that can be resolved is primarily dependent on Iraq's openness and honesty and, to a lesser degree, supplier Governments' responses to the Commission's requests for assistance in verifying Iraq's accounts of imports.

32. Establishing an effective ongoing monitoring and verification system is no simple task and allows no short cuts. Each site to be monitored needs to be inspected thoroughly and a monitoring and verification protocol prepared for it. This entails preparation and collation of data and imagery from all previous ground and aerial inspections with the results of the Commission's analysis of these. Sensors and tags have to be identified and installed. So long as Iraq continues to cooperate, however, the system should be established soon.

33. Establishing an export/import monitoring mechanism also requires further work (see para. 27 above). After adoption by the Security Council of the necessary resolution approving the mechanism, States will have to take the steps necessary to give internal effect to the mechanism.

Appendix I

Financial and organizational issues

A. Current and future financial mechanism

1. When the Security Council created the Special Commission in April 1991, the organizational structure and the financing arrangements focused upon the identification and destruction phases of the work of the Special Commission and IAEA. At that time, these phases were seen as being of limited duration. Ad hoc measures for staffing and financing were thus resorted to. These included two Security Council resolutions, 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), permitting limited sales of Iraqi oil. Iraq refused to comply with those resolutions. The Council thus adopted, in October 1992, resolution 778 (1992), calling for the transfer of Iraqi assets under third-party control to an escrow account administered by the Secretary-General. Funds deposited in this account have allowed the Special Commission and IAEA to cover their operating budget, total expenditure reaching $55.2 million by the end of 1993. This amount includes $13 million for the first phase of the contract for the removal of nuclear fuel.

2. To date, the Commission and IAEA have been able to operate on this very uncertain financial basis. However, as the Commission and IAEA move into ongoing monitoring and verification, which will be of indefinite duration, it will be necessary for a solid financial base to be established, which will provide the assurance of adequate and continuous financing free of Iraqi control. This is an issue to which the Security Council will have to address itself when it contemplates action on paragraphs 21 and 22 of resolution 687 (1991).

B. Organizational issues

3. Following Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), the Commission's activities have focused increasingly on the implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. These require, inter alia, that Iraq provide regular and detailed information on activities, equipment and programmes which fall under the regime. Under a new export/import control regime, Member States will also provide a large volume of data. For the Commission's part, this information will be verified by on-site and aerial inspections, information provided from other sources and through the use of various monitoring devices installed at facilities.

4. The organizational and administrative structure of the Commission in New York and in Iraq is being adapted to allow the Commission to maintain its current level of support for intrusive operations while meeting the requirements for ongoing monitoring and verification.

New York

5. Additional staff in the chemical, biological, ballistic and export/import control areas have been provided to the Commission by supporting Governments to

assess Iraq's declarations, to develop monitoring and verification protocols and to draft procedures for the export/import monitoring mechanism. It is anticipated that the Commission will require, for the next six months, six experts in support of chemical activities, six for ballistic and four for biological. The nuclear component of the Commission will remain at two. Data analysis and photographic imagery will have a total of five staff. Additional staff will also be brought in for the development of operational plans for export/import control.

The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre

6. The activities of the Commission with regard to ongoing monitoring and verification will require an expansion of its facilities in Baghdad. Plans have been drawn up for the establishment of the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre. The Iraqi side was informed of these plans, responding to them positively and designating the premises of the United Nations located in the Canal Hotel as the site for the Centre. This Centre will serve the requirements of both the Commission and IAEA. A Director for the Centre has been recruited.

7. Additional office space to accommodate an expanded presence has been identified. Communication equipment has been ordered to increase the total of telephone lines to New York to five, which will allow transmission of data between Baghdad and New York. Data from sites monitored with cameras and other sensors will be transmitted as required to the operations room via telephone and radio links. For this purpose, a 100-metre communications mast provided by Iraq is being erected at the Canal Hotel. Facilities will be available for analysing the data received from the monitored sites and for archiving essential information required in Baghdad. Computers capable of storing relevant protocol information in an electronic form will be installed. The Aerial Inspection Team will be able to process photographs in Baghdad and integrate imagery into the monitoring and verification protocols.

8. Great attention was given to achieving the highest possible level of security at the Centre in order to protect the information gathered and to allow inspectors and analysts to conduct their work in a protected environment.

9. The Operations Room will be moved from the Sheraton Hotel to the Canal Hotel once the construction work in the Canal Hotel is completed. A secure telephone extension will be maintained at the Sheraton Hotel for the use of inspection teams.

10. The support staff will be increased to maintain and operate communications, data collection and analysis equipment which will be acquired by the Commission. In addition to the support staff, Governments will be requested to provide resident experts in aerial imagery, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and chemical industry, microbiology, nuclear technology and export/import control. They will be sent to Baghdad for a three- to six-month tour of duty. Training in monitoring techniques and in the maintenance of the monitoring equipment will be organized.

11. The Commission hopes that all equipment required to operate the Centre, i.e., communication equipment, office furniture, video cameras, motion sensors, chemical and biological samplers, photo imagery equipment and the database computers, will be provided by contributing Governments as a donation, on a loan basis, or to be reimbursed upon availability of funds from Iraq.

12. While personnel are being recruited and equipment purchased for the task of ongoing monitoring and verification, the Chemical Destruction Group was disbanded at the completion of its task. Personnel have returned to their countries of origin, as has most of the equipment supplied to the Group.

Appendix II

Inspection activities

A. Missiles

1. Iraq's acceptance of its obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) led to intensive work to establish a monitoring mechanism of missile-related activities and dual-purpose capabilities in Iraq pursuant to the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in the non-nuclear area (S/22871/Rev.1 of 2 October 1991). These efforts included a number of inspections, assessment of Iraq's declarations submitted under the Plan, identification of focal points for monitoring and appropriate monitoring techniques, including their field trials, preparation of draft monitoring and verification protocols and in-depth discussions with the Iraqi side of monitoring issues, including during the rounds of high-level talks both in New York and Baghdad. In parallel, the Commission continued its investigation into Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes and its compliance with resolution 687 (1991).

1. Inspection activities

(a) BM20/UNSCOM66

2. BM20/UNSCOM66 operated in Iraq over the period from 21 to 29 January 1994. In view of Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), BM20/UNSCOM66 was tasked to accomplish the following:

(a) To update data collected by previous inspection teams on Iraq's missile research and development programme;

(b) To examine issues related to Iraq's reporting on facilities to be monitored under the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in the missile area as approved by resolution 715 (1991);

(c) To conduct a preliminary survey for possible application of monitoring sensors and technologies.

3. BM20/UNSCOM66 visited a number of research and development and industrial facilities to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and verification Plan. Iraq provided the team with a detailed update of its current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres.

4. BM20/UNSCOM66 carried out extensive work related to Iraq's reporting obligations under the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. This included discussions of Iraq's reporting on facilities to be monitored, examination of declarations submitted by Iraq in January 1994 pursuant to the Plan and practical on-site investigation of relevant issues. This work resulted in a draft format for Iraq's reporting on those missile research-and-development and production facilities that would be under the most intensive monitoring regime. During inspection and soon after it, Iraq submitted to the Commission

reports under this format for all relevant facilities. As a result of BM20/UNSCOM66, Iraq also provided corrections to its January declarations under the Plan in the missile area. Iraq has yet to provide required data on some of its missile projects.

5. BM20/UNSCOM66 started a survey of sites where installation of sensors and use of other technologies might be appropriate for monitoring purposes. This survey addressed issues of inventory control of dual-purpose equipment, non-removal of equipment from declared facilities and monitoring of activities at facilities. Use of a variety of sensors and recording devices could be an important part of monitoring procedures under the Plan.

(b) BM21/UNSCOM69

6. BM21/UNSCOM69 was in Iraq from 17 to 25 February to accomplish the following:

(a) To assess Iraq's dual-purpose missile industrial capabilities that might be used in support of missile production;

(b) To continue compiling the database on Iraq's machine tools and equipment usable for missile production;

(c) To carry out an assessment of possibilities of installing sensors and using other technologies to monitor missile-related industrial activities.

7. BM21/UNSCOM69 visited 15 facilities in Iraq, identified a number of focal points for monitoring activities at those sites and carried out a survey for the use of sensors. The machine tool database built by IMTIC/UNSCOM57 was updated, new machines were recorded and some items were tagged.

8. The results of BM21/UNSCOM69 provided the Commission with the necessary background data to refine a scope of facilities for ongoing monitoring and verification under the Plan.

(c) BM22/UNSCOM71

9. Based on the results of BM20/UNSCOM66 and BM21/UNSCOM69, BM22/UNSCOM71 was organized to prepare draft monitoring and verification protocols for facilities identified so far by the Commission as needing to be subject to ongoing monitoring and verification. This was the first protocol-building team sent to Iraq as a part of baseline activities in the missile area under the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Ongoing monitoring and verification protocols incorporate detailed procedures and information required for monitoring activities, using a variety of different means at sites in Iraq covered by the Plan. They will also contain a systematic collection of that information known about sites concerned necessary for effective monitoring and verification. Once created, a protocol for a given site would be updated as necessary on the basis of the findings of monitoring and verification activities.

10. BM22/UNSCOM71 carried out its activities in Iraq from 30 March to 20 May 1994 through a succession of rounds of visits to Iraq. The team visited more than 30 facilities to be placed, depending on the nature of their activities, under different regimes of monitoring. During these visits, the team verified on-site Iraq's declarations concerning these facilities. The team also conducted the survey of the sites to identify focal points for monitoring activities. BM22/UNSCOM71 has submitted to the Commission for approval draft ongoing monitoring and verification protocols with recommendations for monitoring arrangements and inspection modalities at the facilities to be monitored. These recommendations, include, inter alia, suggestions for the installation of cameras of different types and for tagging and monitoring missile-related and dual-purpose equipment. The recommendations also contain proposals for on-site inspection programmes for each facility, amounting to a total of more than 100 inspection visits per year. Successful completion of BM22/UNSCOM71 marked a large and critical step towards the creation of a monitoring and verification regime in the missile area.

(d) BM23/UNSCOM79 and BM24/UNSCOM80

11. BM24/UNSCOM80 began its mission in Iraq on 10 June. This inspection team is tasked to conduct tagging of a number of operational missile systems in Iraq covered by the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. The Plan provides for monitoring of missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres.

12. The purpose of this tagging operation is to assist the Commission in effective monitoring of non-modification of a number of missile systems and keep a reliable inventory control of missiles under monitoring. In total, BM24/UNSCOM80 tagged more than 1,300 missiles of different types. All missiles were tagged by UNSCOM inspectors, with Iraq's authorities providing preparations and support necessary for safe and efficient operations. BM24/UNSCOM80 also visited a number of sites to ascertain that they were not suitable for prohibited modification activities.

13. After the baseline activities related to operational missiles are completed, the Commission will request Iraq, up to three times per year, to assemble a limited number of tagged missiles for purposes of inspecting them and making sure that they have not been modified to enable missiles to reach a range greater than 150 kilometres. The Commission will select for each inspection up to 10 per cent of the quantity of tagged missiles.

14. As of this writing, BM24/UNSCOM80 is completing its mission in Iraq, with departure planned for 24 June 1994.

15. Monitoring arrangements for operational missiles, including tagging, required extensive preparations and elaboration of appropriate operational modalities. BM23/UNSCOM79 was in Iraq from 23 to 28 May 1994 to conduct preparations for BM24/UNSCOM80. BM23/UNSCOM79 checked on-site work areas for tagging operations and other preparatory work done by the Iraqi authorities for the tagging activities. Prime attention was paid to the safety aspects of working with live missiles. Special operational procedures were established by the Commission for this purpose.

16. BM23/UNSCOM79 also established a technical reference baseline for Iraq's missile systems of interest to the Commission. Reference data for each missile system was gathered to include measurements and photography of major parts and components. The data collected will be used to establish "official" UNSCOM missile configurations for each missile system for use in future inspections and to support automated processing of data collected from the monitoring cameras.

(e) BM25/UNSCOM81

17. BM25/UNSCOM81 arrived in Baghdad on 14 June 1994 and plans to accomplish its mission by 22 June 1994. The objectives of this team were twofold: to present to Iraq's experts definitions elaborated by the Commission of the dual-purpose items contained in annex IV of the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, and to discuss certain aspects of the past prohibited activities in Iraq, including missile production and modification projects.

(f) Sensors and tagging

18. Remote-monitoring cameras remain at the two missile test stands. They continue to work in a satisfactory manner and the data obtained allow UNSCOM to monitor on a continuous basis Iraq's static missile testing programme.

19. During December 1993, a team was sent to Baghdad to upgrade these systems. The upgrade gave UNSCOM a better analysis capability by installing higher-resolution cameras. The team also placed the cameras in different areas of the sites, allowing for a better field of view. Telephone-line transmission of signals from the sites to the UNSCOM office in Baghdad was replaced by radio transmission to allow for reliable communications.

20. As mentioned above, BM20/UNSCOM66, BM21/UNSCOM69 and BM22/UNSCOM71 conducted surveys of the missile research-and-development and production sites in Iraq to determine where to install sensors and employ tags for monitoring purposes. Their recommendations included the use of monitoring cameras for what was considered to be critical areas of these facilities. The teams made a number of proposals on the use of tags and different types of sensors to help identify and monitor specific activities and equipment.

21. Experts will visit Iraq in July to install cameras and to tag equipment identified for monitoring. They will also install equipment in the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre to control these systems. Initially, there will be two basic types of cameras. Both will be time-lapsed video, one with motion sensors and one without. All camera systems will be capable of transmitting data to the Centre.

2. Other activities

22. In support of its efforts to establish a mechanism for ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission held a number of meetings with international experts. During these meetings, issues discussed related to the assessment of Iraq's declarations, identification of critical points for monitoring missile-related activities and appropriate techniques, including sensors, to ensure

effective monitoring. Lists of dual-purpose equipment, technologies and other items that could be used for the development, production, modification or acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres were also discussed.

3. Past prohibited activities

23. The Commission continued its investigation of the outstanding issues related to the past missile programme proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). This work is essential to establish a solid and verified baseline for ongoing monitoring and verification in accordance with resolution 715 (1991). In particular, this will allow the Commission to have a full and comprehensive picture of the knowledge Iraq obtained in the missile area through its past activities.

24. Issues related to programmes proscribed under section C of resolution 687 (1991) were discussed with Iraq on a continuous basis, especially during the rounds of the high-level talks in November 1993 and March 1994 in New York. Iraq has furnished additional details on foreign acquisition of critical ballistic missile items as well as its expenditure of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. Verification of this and other information provided by Iraq continued, including through contacts with Governments that possess data of relevance to this work.

25. The Commission continued to reiterate its request that Iraq provide original documentation that would substantiate the declarations made by Iraq concerning its past prohibited missile programmes. During the February visit of the Executive Chairman to Baghdad, Iraq finally agreed to give the Commission files on the expenditure of prohibited missiles. This documentation covers the period from 1977 to December 1990 and accounts for nearly three quarters of the missiles covered by resolution 687 (1991) and declared by Iraq. Currently, the Commission is conducting an in-depth investigation of these documents and the information contained therein. The results of this investigation will be critical for the Commission's reporting to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).

B. Chemical weapons

1. Inspection activities

26. CW12/UNSCOM65 was constituted at short notice to investigate persistent reports that chemical weapons had been used by Iraqi Government troops against opposition elements in the southern marshes of Iraq. Initially, the team assembled as a fact-finding mission and visited the Islamic Republic of Iran to obtain clarifications about the allegations from persons claiming to have witnessed the incident, specifically to obtain an exact location of the site at which the alleged chemical weapon attack took place. Upon obtaining this information, this team returned to Bahrain for further preparations and entered Iraq, as CW12/UNSCOM65, on 19 November 1993.

27. During the inspection, the team conducted a thorough inspection of the site and took a large number of soil, water, flora and fauna samples which were analysed in various laboratories expert in the analysis of such samples. The team also inspected the area around the site of the alleged attack. Vehicles, boats and helicopters were used in the survey. During the inspection, the team did not find any immediate evidence of the use of chemical weapons. One unexploded munition was discovered at the site but was in too dangerous a condition for the team to take samples from. Consequently, a second team of explosive demolition experts from the Commission's Chemical Destruction Group at Muthanna was dispatched to the site, on 25 November 1993, and concluded that the munition was not a chemical munition but a highly explosive rocket-propelled grenade. It was destroyed by the experts.

28. In the course of its investigation, the Commission has also obtained some documents, which were examined and retained for forensic examination and analysis.

29. The chemical analysis of the samples, undertaken in laboratories in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, showed no evidence of the presence of chemical-weapons agents in the samples and so indicated that chemical weapons had not been used during the previous two years in the inspected area (the southern marshes of Iraq). The environmental conditions (e.g., flora and fauna) observed and documented by the team supported the results of the analysis. Based on these results, the forensic examination of the documents, which Iraqi opposition personnel claimed proved the use of chemical-weapons agents, was cancelled.

30. In the period from 1 to 11 February 1994, CW13/UNSCOM67 inventoried and tagged approximately 240 pieces of dual-use chemical production equipment. This equipment had been procured under the auspices of Iraq's chemical warfare programme.

31. The team also visited the Ibn al Baytar facility in order to create a monitoring and verification protocol for that site. The purpose was to assess whether the general model for monitoring and verification protocols developed in the Commission's headquarters in New York were indeed applicable in practice to dual-purpose chemical facilities.

32. As a result of CW13/UNSCOM67, the Iraqi side received on 14 March 1994 an official letter specifying those items of the chemical production equipment which the Commission had decided should be destroyed. Iraq was provided with precise descriptions of the items. In addition, Iraq was asked to provide, by 30 April 1994, a detailed description of the intended permitted future use of the remaining tagged equipment for a final decision on their disposal. Otherwise, the Commission would also have to consider whether the items would also need to be destroyed. Those items not destroyed would then be subjected to ongoing monitoring and verification.

33. During the period from 20 to 26 March 1994, CW14/UNSCOM70 installed four air samplers at the Muthanna site. These samplers are designed to determine the types and levels of chemicals in the air at that site. The team also employed portable samplers which took additional samples for gaining an even more

comprehensive survey of the air at Muthanna. The samplers were installed in a pattern which would cover air quality on the site from all wind directions. An Iraqi maintenance and construction crew prepared the mounting poles for the samplers. The samplers were programmed to sample the air around the clock in a discontinuous mode for a 30-day period. The sample tubes are to be removed, replaced with fresh tubes every 30 days and sent to laboratories for analysis. The sampler mechanism is microprocessor-controlled and is powered by a storage battery which is charged by a solar panel. A microprocessor-driven meteorological station is mounted on one of the samplers to record hourly wind speed, wind direction, temperature and humidity. This meteorological data is to be down-loaded each time the sampler tubes are changed and will become part of the permanent record of the sample set.

34. CW15/UNSCOM74 conducted its activities in Iraq from 19 to 21 April 1994. Its task was to verify the additional information provided by Iraq in the course of the technical part of the high-level talks held in mid-March 1994 in New York. Owing to Iraq's claim that all documents concerning the past programmes of weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed in 1991 and 1992, the team had to resort to indirect proofs. This included interviews with senior personnel involved in Iraq's past chemical weapons programme as well as in Iraq's data recollection seminars held over the period January-March 1994.

35. The Iraqi side was able to provide a credible overview of the past chemical weapons-activities between 1980 and 1988 and in 1990. A major step forward was the presentation of a handwritten copy of the inventory of the procurement activities between 1982 and 1988. This contained a list of "Letter of Credit" numbers, with additional details on suppliers, values of contracts and general description of goods. Iraq claimed the list covered all procurement activities of the chemical weapons programme. An initial evaluation shows that the Iraqi presentation seems to be credible and possibly complete. However, a thorough examination will require much work and a further round of contacts with the supplier Governments.

36. Iraq, during this inspection, claimed that, when the chemical weapons programme was recommenced in 1980, "the Project" could rely for the first two years on the resources of a previous unsuccessful operating organization which stopped its activities in 1978. It was claimed that all procurement activities related to Iraq's chemical weapons programme were cancelled in summer 1988 at the end of the Iran-Iraq war. In 1989 only pesticides were formulated or produced at SEPP/MSE. Iraq claims that the production of live agents was resumed for only one month in 1990. Iraq also admitted, for the first time, that it received direct support from a foreign country in the chemical weapons programme.

37. During this inspection, Iraq also presented its intentions concerning the reuse of dual-use chemical production equipment in civilian projects, such as the production of phenol and aniline. The Iraqi Ministry of Chemical Industry intends to make use of the infrastructure of the former chemical weapons-related areas at Fallujahs 1, 2 and 3 by establishing a chemical centre for the production of general chemicals and fine chemicals. Production would be at a rate of several hundred to some thousand tonnes per year. A very preliminary evaluation of this intended use of the equipment is that it seems reasonable.

UNSCOM always has the possibility to trace the whereabouts of the production equipment.

38. CW16/UNSCOM75 was a "protocol-building" mission that visited 14 sites of chemical interest between 25 May and 5 June 1994. The protocol for each site is a complete folder containing information on the site, Iraqi declarations, UNSCOM assessments and guidance for future inspectors. The sites visited had varying levels of interest for future chemical weapons inspections. Some sites are of high interest since these sites still retain the potential to revert to chemical weapons precursor production. They have equipment, personnel and know-how which could be brought into a chemical weapons operating mode in a relatively short period. Other sites visited have less potential to be converted for use in a chemical weapons programme. There are a total of 47 sites for which protocols are to be developed. The remaining sites will be covered in two more missions.

39. For information on CW17/UNSCOM76, CW18/UNSCOM77 and the conclusion of CDG/UNSCOM38, see appendix III.

2. Data collection

40. In parallel with the various rounds of high-level political talks, UNSCOM experts have held three technical meetings with Iraq on chemical weapons issues.

(a) Past programmes

41. In the course of the meeting held in New York in November 1993, Iraq stressed that it had tried to meet all the requirements put forward by the Commission on the provision of information. However, Iraq agreed to endeavour to address any questions that might arise during the Commission's verification activities. The Commission, for its part, informed Iraq that it had assessed as credible the information provided in the talks held in Baghdad in October 1993 regarding Iraq's past chemical weapons programme. However, in the absence of documentation, independent verification of the data remained problematic. The Commission suggested that Iraq, in order to address this problem in part, hold seminars of the officials involved in the chemical weapons programme aimed at stimulating the collective memory to remember details which might facilitate independent verification. The issue of equipment and chemicals left at the Muthanna State Establishment was also discussed. It was agreed that the Commission should send a mission to Baghdad in January 1994 to mark equipment in order to prepare an inventory as to the release or disposal of that equipment. Further discussion was reserved on the release or disposal of chemicals remaining at the site.

42. During the meeting held in Baghdad in February 1994, Iraq informed the Commission of the results of its seminar with senior Iraqi personnel formerly involved in the chemical weapons programme. Additional data on outstanding issues, e.g., the research-and-development programme and imports of precursor chemicals, were provided.

43. During the meeting held in New York in March 1994, the Commission asked Iraq for additional details to fill in gaps in previously provided information.

In response, Iraq presented the results of another seminar it had convened, this time involving retired former officials. These included a breakdown of the quantities of imported precursor chemicals by year and contract. In addition, Iraq was able to present a correlation, on an annual basis, between produced quantities of agents, available precursor chemicals, stored and consumed agents and available chemical production capacity. A complete overview of its chemical weapons research-and-development programme, including time-frames, was also provided.

44. The additional information obtained during the course of these meetings was essential to the Commission's efforts to obtain as full a picture of Iraq's chemical weapons programme as possible. For example, in October 1993 Iraq declared 13,221 tonnes of traceable imported precursor chemicals, in February 1994 15,037 tonnes, and in March 1994 17,657 tonnes. The declared quantities of produced agents, however, remained unchanged at 4,340.5 tonnes.

45. CW15/UNSCOM74 considered that, during the April discussions held in Baghdad, Iraq had presented to the best of its ability the history of its chemical weapons programme. The orders of magnitude of the declared figures appear credible and the account presented is now more internally consistent than previous accounts. While little new information was divulged on Iraq's chemical weapons research and development, production and weaponization, some of the Commission's earlier conclusions on these matters were corroborated.

46. As supporting documentary evidence for its declarations, Iraq provided a handwritten extract of a list of letters of credit issued for the purpose of purchases for the chemical weapons programme. The list provides some possibility to verify, through contacts with the Governments of the companies named in the list, Iraq's declared imports for the programme. This process of contacting the Governments concerned is well under way, but here UNSCOM is highly dependent on the timely assistance of the Governments.

(b) Declarations of dual-purpose facilities

47. In December 1993, the Commission provided Iraq with model formats for the latter's initial declarations, required under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, of dual-purpose chemical facilities. On 16 January 1994, Iraq delivered to the Commission's Field Office in Baghdad partially completed formats. At subsequent meetings of the two sides, Iraq was informed by the Commission of the inadequacies of these returns and of what was required to bring them into conformity with the Commission's requirements. Iraq was told that full initial declarations were one of the main prerequisites for the protocol-building procedure and hence for the initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification. Since then, several meetings of experts from the two sides have addressed this issue, with the result that the Commission now has a more complete set of declarations for such facilities.

C. Biological weapons

1. Inspection activities

48. The first biological inspections in the baseline process started with the fourth biological inspection team (BW4/UNSCOM72), which conducted its activities in Iraq from 8 to 26 April 1994. This inspection verified the declarations submitted by Iraq in January 1994 pursuant to the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Other objectives of this inspection were: to provide an assessment of the work being undertaken and of the equipment present at those biological facilities declared by Iraq, many of which had not previously been visited by UNSCOM; to establish an inventory of said equipment for future tagging; to draft a format for Iraq's regular reports under the monitoring and verification plan; and to provide a preliminary feasibility study regarding remote monitoring of some of the facilities.

49. During the period from 28 May to 7 June 1994, an inspection (BW5/UNSCOM78) was conducted to construct an inventory of biological dual-purpose equipment. The equipment of interest was located in a variety of facilities involved mainly in biological production or research and development. The inventory was developed in three stages: marking of the items of interest with tamper-proof, bar-coded, polymer-coated tape; close-up photography of these items; and the entry of such items and their codes in the inventory. The inventory will provide an overview of Iraq's biological capabilities through accountability of the equipment's use, transfer or modification.

2. Data collection

50. Following the presentation of Iraq's declarations in January 1994, high-level talks were conducted with Iraqi officials in February and March 1994. These discussions focused upon the information to be provided by Iraq for an efficient and effective monitoring of the biological area. The outcome of these discussions was the provision by Iraq of a new version of the declarations required under the Plan in a form which would allow the accuracy and completeness of the information to be analysed.

51. During BW4/UNSCOM72, further discussions were held with Iraq concerning additional facilities subject to declarations under the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Subsequently, Iraq made supplementary declarations on these sites. In early June 1994, a team of experts held technical talks in Baghdad with Iraq on biological issues aimed at clarifying or completing information previously provided under the Plan, in order to facilitate the analytical work required to establish a monitoring regime for all the sites.

3. Seminars of experts in New York

52. In March 1994, a seminar of international experts was held in New York to prepare for inspections connected with establishing the biological baseline. In May 1994, a further seminar was held as part of the Commission's efforts to review all declarations and data on Iraq's biological capabilities. Discussions

focused on the establishment of criteria for use in assessing data on Iraq's relevant biological activities and on the identification of items to be controlled through the export/import monitoring mechanism. Further seminars are planned to discuss the following aspects of the biological elements of the Plan: sensors and other monitoring technologies; monitoring modalities; and requirements for the training of inspectors.

4. Protocol-building efforts

53. Efforts to build the protocols for each biological site are under way. The information relating to the geographical location has been compiled. Further information will be obtained throughout the baseline process. A draft of the format for information to be provided by Iraq has been developed.

5. Remote monitoring and tagging trials

54. A feasibility study of monitoring by cameras was conducted during BW4/UNSCOM72. Further efforts in this field will be effected initially by way of seminars. Tagging technologies have already been identified and deemed appropriate with respect to bio-technological equipment. Based on the results of these seminars and information from inspections, cameras and additional tags may be installed at a later date.

D. Nuclear

55. Activities in the nuclear area are reported separately by IAEA. However, the Special Commission conducted a second gamma aerial survey from 2 to 15 December 1993. During that mission, the team surveyed six sites. It obtained detailed gamma spectra at radioactive disposal areas at Tuwaitha as well as two areas at Al Atheer. In addition, gamma surveys were conducted at Rashdiya, Al Hadre, a site near Tikrit, and Salah Al Din State Establishment (SAAD-13). While the data are still being analysed, early indications show the power of this capability to survey rapidly a relatively large area and to pinpoint particular sites for more detailed investigation. This system is still being developed, and improvements are under way.

E. Aerial inspections

56. The Commission's aerial inspections, using both helicopters and high-altitude surveillance aircraft, continued over the period under review. The Commission's high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (U-2) now flies once or twice a week, having flown a total of 209 missions since the inception of its use in support of the Commission's operations. The Commission's helicopters have now flown over 300 missions, covering some 450 sites. The Aerial Inspection Team currently conducts three to four flights a week. In all, the Commission's helicopters have completed over 2,000 flying hours in direct support of the Commission's activities.

Appendix III

Destruction of Iraq's chemical agents and munitions

1. A full background report on chemical destruction activities has been given in previous reports. The present report focuses solely on developments since December 1993 and the closing down of the Chemical Destruction Group.

Safety and security aspects

2. The high level of safety standards at Muthanna has been maintained over the reporting period. As in the past, Iraqi requests to lower some standards in order to speed up work have been rejected. Efforts to educate the Iraqi side about safety standards made some slow progress. However, set-backs occurred from time to time but were all contained without serious accident because of quick action of the Chemical Destruction Group.

3. UNSCOM observed increasing pressure on the Muthanna management since November 1993, when the Iraqis started to speed up the support of destruction activities. Most of the minor incidents occurred between November 1993 and April 1994 and can be seen as a direct result of pressure on the Muthanna management from the Government of Iraq. UNSCOM has provided about 100 protective suits to Iraqi workers at Muthanna. The offer was accepted very reluctantly. In summary, the high safety standards have paid dividends.

Destruction activities

4. The destruction of chemical warfare agents and precursors was completed by early April 1994. Destruction figures are listed below. A number of missile solid-propellant components were also destroyed in May 1994.

5. After 6 April 1994, the Chemical Destruction Group concentrated on the destruction of dual-use chemical production equipment. The identification and the tagging of this equipment was the main objective of UNSCOM 67 in January/February 1994. That mission provided the Executive Chairman with recommendations for the categories of equipment to be destroyed or returned to Iraq. As noted in appendix II, section B, on the occasion of high-level talks in New York in March 1994, Iraq received a letter containing the Executive Chairman's decision on the destruction of equipment. This provided the basic reference for the activities of the Chemical Destruction Group. Besides single pieces of equipment, the main installations which have been destroyed and partly sealed off are the hydrolysis plant, pilot plants, the aerosol test chamber, the DF plant, and the mustard plant.

6. Bunkers and specially designed, concrete-lined lagoons which have been used for the storage of chemical waste from destruction activities have been sealed off with reinforced concrete according to the directions given by the Destruction Advisory Panel. The incinerator has been given back to the Iraqi authorities. However, all tubes and valves around the burning chamber have been dismantled and stored in bunkers, as they were heavily contaminated.

Closure of the Chemical Destruction Group

7. The closure of Muthanna comprised the following steps:

(a) An area sweep. The main effort fell on those areas where the Group had conducted its major activities (e.g., incinerator, hydrolysis plant, accumulation areas). In parallel, full documentation on bunker sealing was prepared. This was followed by an extended check and sweep, i.e, a clean-up operation. This stage was completed in mid-May 1994;

(b) Two UNSCOM inspections, the first of which (CW17/UNSCOM76) operated from 31 May to 12 June 1994. Its aim was to take samples and to analyse them in real time at Muthanna in order to provide hard data on the state of the site at Muthanna at the time of handover. These results were incorporated into the Muthanna handover protocol, prepared by the follow-on inspection (CW18/UNSCOM77), which operated from 8 to 14 June 1994. In order to ensure accurate transfer of results and full coordination, these two inspections overlapped by three days. CW18/UNSCOM77 conducted a final inspection and transferred responsibility for Muthanna back to the Iraqi authorities. On 14 June 1994, the Chemical Destruction Group (UNSCOM38) and CW18/UNSCOM77 left Iraq, and the Chemical Destruction Group was disbanded. In all, 100 experts served with the Group;

(c) Completion of final documentation on the Chemical Destruction Group in New York. All Group files will be kept in New York. A documentation team will cover every aspect of operations of the Group, making observations on lessons to be learnt and recommendations for any similar future operation.

Summary

8. The Chemical Destruction Group has successfully completed its mission. The disbanding of the Group on 16 June 1994 marked the completion of one of the Commission's prime mandates under Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Totals for items destroyed at Al Muthanna

Description		
122 mm rockets and warheads	319	
122 mm warheads	6 454	
155 mm artillery shells - empty	12	
155 mm artillery shells - mustard	12 792	
155 mm artillery shells - WP a/	45	
Al Hussein warhead (GB/GF)	16	
Al Hussein warhead - empty	13	
R400 bomb	337	
250 gauge bomb - oil-filled	5 176	
250 gauge bomb - polymust b/	703	
250 gauge bomb - empty	12	
250 gauge bomb - WP a/	8	
500 gauge bomb - oil-filled	4	
500 gauge bomb - polymust b/	980	
500 gauge bomb - GA	2	
DB 2 bomb - unfilled	1 115	
DB O bomb - unfilled	61	
Total munitions	28 049	
Mustard agent	398 046	litres
Nerve agent (GA)	21 365	
Nerve agent (GB/GF)	61 633	
Total CW agent	481 044	litres

a/ White phosphorus.

b/ Partially filled with polymerized mustard agent.

Description		
DF	14 600	litres
D4	121 675	
Thiodiethyleneglycol	153 980	
Phosphorus oxychloride	344 800	
Thionyl chloride	169 980	
Phosphorus trichloride	415 000	
Isopropyl alcohol	250 888	
Cyclohexanol/isopropyl alcohol	5 200	
Dichlorethane	4 120	
Di-isopropylamine	30 000	
Morpholine	10 000	
Chlorobenzaldehyde	41 800	
Ethylchlorohydride	1 900	
Monoethyleneglycol	49 600	
Malononitrile	200	
Ethanol	112 700	
Thiokolpolysulphide	60	
3-hydroxy 2-methyl piperdine	50	
Hydrogen sulphide	160	
Methanol	42 000	
Toluene	10 800	
Pyridine	19 000	
Total precursor chemicals	1 798 513	litres
Dimethyl amine HCl	238 500	kg
Sodium cyanide	180 000	
Potassium cyanide	3 000	
Potassium hydrogen di-fluoride	450 000	
Sodium fluoride	135 000	
Arsenic trichloride	1 850	
Hydrogen fluoride	7 000	
Mandelic acid	1 650	
Tri-ethanolamine	511	
Methyl dichloride	2 250	
Glycolic acid	50	
Diethylaminoethanol thiol HCl	10	
2-ethylaminoethanol	180	
Chloroacetic acid	2 500	
Dimethyl amine	7 210	
Methyl iodide	2 000	
Potassium fluoride	600	
Sodium chloroacetate	250	
Aluminium trichloride	2 800	
Potassium iodide	3 000	
Arsenic trichloride	75	
2,4-dichlorophenol	2 250	
Trichlorophenol	150	
Total chemical precursors	1 040 836	kg

Description	
White phosphorus	648 barrels
Bulk storage containers	32 (2-tonne)

Appendix IV

The Information Assessment Unit

1. Following Iraq's acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), the work of the Information Assessment Unit has increasingly focused on the implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification. However, this has not been to the exclusion of work on past programmes, where substantial effort has been devoted to verifying Iraq's declarations concerning its former weapons of mass destruction programmes. The Information Assessment Unit also continues to analyse and assess information from supporting Governments and other sources concerning possible outstanding issues in relation to these programmes.

2. The steps under way in the different areas to implement ongoing monitoring and verification are described in detail elsewhere in the present report. However, from the perspective of the Information Assessment Unit, the main practical consequence of Iraq's acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) has been a vast increase in the amount and content of declarations provided by the Iraqi side. One set of declarations, for example, contained over 2,000 pages of material.

3. The present declarations are being provided in response to draft formats drawn up by the Commission which describe in detail the content and form of the information required for ongoing monitoring and verification. The declarations received in answer to these draft formats require assessment from a number of perspectives. These include reviewing the accuracy of the data supplied and the range and type of facilities declared. The declarations also contain a number of sites not previously inspected by UNSCOM; these need to be identified and preparations for initial inspections undertaken. An additional element of the review process is to assess whether the formats themselves require modification; this is an important aspect of the analysis process, since the final versions of the formats and the consequent declarations constitute an important part of the architecture for ongoing monitoring and verification.

4. In addition to reviewing declarations, a major project has been undertaken within the Information Assessment Unit to compile records for each site to be monitored, drawing upon, inter alia, past inspection reports, information from supporting countries and photography. These records will provide the analysts with a comprehensive record of the history of each site undergoing monitoring.

5. Interface with external organizations and other bodies continues to be of great assistance. As an example, over the course of the next six months a new computer system will be installed in the Unit. It will be capable of handling both textual and graphic material, thus providing a computerized version of the site records described in paragraph 4 above. The system is being developed by an outside agency for the Commission's current requirements and will be capable of adapting to the changing requirements of data handling which will be generated through ongoing monitoring and verification, for example, the development of a system to process the information which will be provided by Iraq and supplier Governments under the export/import control mechanism.

6. The Commission's aerial assets, the high-altitude surveillance aircraft (U-2) and the helicopter-borne Aerial Inspection Team, continue to fulfil their traditional roles. Both assets also provide a useful source of information for preparing for initial inspections at newly declared ongoing monitoring and verification-related sites. The Aerial Inspection Team plays a particularly useful role by preparing site diagrams for new facilities, in advance of ground inspections of the sites.

7. Following the successful introduction of ground-penetrating radar and gamma detection equipment in 1993, the use of additional airborne sensor devices continues to be explored. Further means of exploiting the Commission's current photographic product, as well as potential new sources of material, are being explored. These include the direct transmission of photography.

8. In order to assist with the greater volume of data and to facilitate the establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification, five additional experts have been seconded to the Information Assessment Unit this year. Two new posts have also been created for collators who will act as the interface between the data entry clerks and the analysts. A second computer expert is also being recruited. In addition to resident experts, the Information Assessment Unit also benefits greatly from short periods of assistance at the Commission by experts familiar with the inspection process.

Appendix V

Inspection schedule

(in-country dates)

Nuclear

15 May-21 May 1991	IAEA1/UNSCOM 1
22 June-3 July 1991	IAEA2/UNSCOM 4
7 July-18 July 1991	IAEA3/UNSCOM 5
27 July-10 August 1991	IAEA4/UNSCOM 6
14 September-20 September 1991	IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
21 September-30 September 1991	IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
11 October-22 October 1991	IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
11 November-18 November 1991	IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
11 January-14 January 1992	IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
5 February-13 February 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
7 April-15 April 1992	IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
26 May-4 June 1992	IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
14 July-21 July 1992	IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
31 August-7 September 1992	IAEA14/UNSCOM 43
8 November-19 November 1992	IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
6 December-14 December 1992	IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
22 January-27 January 1993	IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
3 March-11 March 1993	IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30 April-7 May 1993	IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
25 June-30 June 1993	IAEA20/UNSCOM 58
23 July-28 July 1993	IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
1 November-9 November 1993	IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
4 February-11 February 1994	IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
11 April-22 April 1994	IAEA24/UNSCOM 73
21 June-1 July 1994	IAEA25/UNSCOM 83

Chemical

9 June-15 June 1991	CW1/UNSCOM 2
15 August-22 August 1991	CW2/UNSCOM 9
31 August-8 September 1991	CW3/UNSCOM 11
31 August-5 September 1991	CW4/UNSCOM 12
6 October-9 November 1991	CW5/UNSCOM 17
22 October-2 November 1991	CW6/UNSCOM 20
18 November-1 December 1991	CBW1/UNSCOM 21
27 January-5 February 1992	CW7/UNSCOM 26
21 February-24 March 1992	CDG1/UNSCOM 29
5 April-13 April 1992	CDG2/UNSCOM 32
15 April-29 April 1992	CW8/UNSCOM 35
18 June 1992 ongoing	CDG/UNSCOM 38
26 June-10 July 1992	CBW2/UNSCOM 39
21 September-29 September 1992	CW9/UNSCOM 44
6 December-14 December 1992	CBW3/UNSCOM 47

6 April-18 April 1993	CW10/UNSCOM 55
27 June-30 June 1993	CW11/UNSCOM 59
19 November-22 November 1993	CW12/UNSCOM 65
1 February-14 February 1994	CW13/UNSCOM 67
20 March-26 March 1994	CW14/UNSCOM 70
18 April-22 April 1994	CW15/UNSCOM 74
25 May-5 June 1994	CW16/UNSCOM 75
31 May-12 June 1994	CW17/UNSCOM 76
8 June-14 June 1994	CW18/UNSCOM 77

Biological

2 August-8 August 1991	BW1/UNSCOM 7
20 September-3 October 1991	BW2/UNSCOM 15
11 March-18 March 1993	BW3/UNSCOM 53
8 April-26 April 1994	BW4/UNSCOM 72
28 May-7 June 1994	BW5/UNSCOM 78
24 June-5 July 1994	BW6/UNSCOM 84
5 June-8 June 1994	BW7/UNSCOM 86

Ballistic missiles

30 June-7 July 1991	BM1/UNSCOM 3
18 July-20 July 1991	BM2/UNSCOM 10
8 August-15 August 1991	BM3/UNSCOM 8
6 September-13 September 1991	BM4/UNSCOM 13
1 October-9 October 1991	BM5/UNSCOM 18
1 December-9 December 1991	BM6/UNSCOM 23
9 December-17 December 1991	BM7/UNSCOM 24
21 February-29 February 1992	BM8/UNSCOM 28
21 March-29 March 1992	BM9/UNSCOM 31
13 April-21 April 1992	BM10/UNSCOM 34
14 May-22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM 36
11 July-29 July 1992	BM12/UNSCOM 40 A+B
7 August-18 August 1992	BM13/UNSCOM 42
16 October-30 October 1992	BM14/UNSCOM 45
25 January-23 March 1993	IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
12 February-21 February 1993	BM15/UNSCOM 50
22 February-23 February 1993	BM16/UNSCOM 51
27 March-17 May 1993	IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5 June-28 June 1993	IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
10 July-11 July 1993	BM17/UNSCOM 60
24 August-15 September 1993	BM18/UNSCOM 62
28 September-1 November 1993	BM19/UNSCOM 63
21 January-29 January 1994	BM20/UNSCOM 66
17 February-25 February 1994	BM21/UNSCOM 69
30 March-20 May 1994	BM22/UNSCOM 71
20 May-8 June 1994	BM23/UNSCOM 79
10 June-24 June 1994	BM24/UNSCOM 80
14 June-19 June 1994	BM25/UNSCOM 81

Computer search

12 February 1992 UNSCOM 30

Special missions

30 June-3 July 1991
11 August-14 August 1991
4 October-6 October 1991
11 November-15 November 1991
27 January-30 January 1992
21 February-24 February 1992
17 July-19 July 1992
28 July-29 July 1992
6 September-12 September 1992
4 November-9 November 1992
4 November-8 November 1992
12 March-18 March 1993
14 March-20 March 1993
19 April-24 April 1993
4 June-5 July 1993
15 July-19 July 1993
25 July-5 August 1993
9 August-12 August 1993
10 September-24 September 1993
27 September-1 October 1993
1 October-8 October 1993
5 October 1993-16 February 1994
2 December-10 December 1993
2 December-16 December 1993
21 January-27 January 1994
2 February-6 February 1994
10 April-14 April 1994
24 April-26 April 1994
28 May-29 May 1994

UNITED
NATIONS

A S

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/954
S/1994/751
1 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 40
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE AND PROGRESS IN FASHIONING A REGION OF PEACE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 28 June 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 8 April 1994 (A/48/928-S/1994/448), in which I informed the General Assembly and the Security Council of the signing by the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca of a Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, an Agreement on a Timetable for the Negotiation of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala and a joint statement by the two parties.

I am pleased to inform you that the first item which the parties agreed to negotiate within the Timetable, namely the resettlement of the population groups uprooted by the armed conflict, was successfully concluded with the signing of an Agreement at Oslo on 17 June 1994.

In addition, on 23 June 1994, while still in Oslo, the parties complied with their joint statement of March 1994 and signed an Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer. Copies of both Agreements are attached.

While neither the Agreement on resettlement nor the establishment of the Commission will come into force until the signing of a final peace agreement between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, the parties have agreed in both cases that preparatory work should begin earlier.

With respect to the composition of the Commission, the parties have agreed to request that I designate the current United Nations Moderator of the negotiations as a member of the Commission. Once I receive an official request from the parties on this matter, I shall give it due consideration and I shall inform you accordingly.

The Agreements on resettlement and on the establishment of the Commission are very encouraging developments which consolidate the prospects for an end to over 30 years of armed conflict in Guatemala. It is my hope that the momentum that has been created so far will result in a successful and timely negotiation of the remaining items on the Timetable for the Negotiation of a Firm and Lasting Peace.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

ANNEX I

Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict

Preamble

Reiterating their commitment to put an end to the armed conflict through a negotiation process which lays the bases for a firm and lasting peace in Guatemala,

Considering the national, traumatic dimensions of the uprooting that occurred during the armed conflict in the country, in human, cultural, material, psychological, economic, political and social terms, which caused violations of human rights and great suffering in the communities which were forced to abandon their homes and ways of life, and in the populations which remained in those areas,

Considering the commitment of the Government of Guatemala and of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca to contribute constructively, together with the rest of Guatemalan society, to finding a lasting solution and to facilitating the process of resettling the uprooted population groups in a framework of social justice, democratization and sustained, sustainable and equitable national development,

Considering that the resettlement of these uprooted population groups should be a dynamic factor in the economic, social, political and cultural development of the country and, consequently, an important component of a firm and lasting peace,

Recognizing the indispensable role of the participation of the affected population groups in taking decisions concerning the design and implementation of an effective resettlement strategy,

Bearing in mind the statements and proposals for consensus elaborated on this topic by the civil Assembly, which includes the specific demands of organizations representing the various uprooted groups,

Reiterating that the present Agreement together with those to be signed on the other agenda items in the negotiation process form part of an agreement on a firm and lasting peace and shall enter into force at the time of the signing of such agreement, with the exception of matters relating to the Technical Committee referred to in section V of this agreement and in paragraph 4 of that section,

The Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties") agree as follows:

I. DEFINITIONS, PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR RESETTLING THE POPULATIONS UPROOTED BY ARMED CONFLICT

Definitions

1. For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "uprooted population" shall include all persons who have been uprooted for reasons connected with the armed conflict, whether they live within or outside Guatemala, and shall include, in particular, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons, either dispersed or in groups, including popular resistance groups.

2. "Resettlement" shall mean the legal process of return of uprooted population groups and individuals to their place of origin or another place of their choice in Guatemalan territory, and their relocation and integration therein, in accordance with the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala.

Principles

The Parties agree that a comprehensive solution to the problem of uprooted population groups should be guided by the following principles:

1. Uprooted population groups have the right to reside and live freely in Guatemalan territory. Accordingly, the Government of the Republic undertakes to ensure that conditions exist which permit and guarantee the voluntary return of uprooted persons to their places of origin or to the place of their choice, in conditions of dignity and security.

2. Full respect for the human rights of the uprooted population shall be an essential condition for the resettlement of this population.

3. Uprooted population groups deserve special attention, in view of the consequences they have suffered from being uprooted, through the implementation of a comprehensive, exceptional strategy which ensures, in the shortest possible time, their relocation in conditions of security and dignity and their free and full integration into the social, economic and political life of the country.

4. Uprooted population groups shall participate in decision-making concerning the design, implementation and supervision of the comprehensive resettlement strategy and its specific projects. This participatory principle shall extend to population groups residing in resettlement areas in all aspects concerning them.

5. A comprehensive strategy will be possible only within the perspective of a sustained, sustainable and equitable development of the resettlement areas for the benefit of all the population groups and individuals residing in them in the framework of a national development plan.

6. The implementation of the strategy shall not be discriminatory and shall promote the reconciliation of the interests of the resettled population groups and the population groups already living in the resettlement areas.

Objectives

The comprehensive resettlement strategy shall have the following objectives:

1. To ensure that the uprooted population groups fully enjoy all their rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular those rights and freedoms which were affected during the uprooting process;

2. To reintegrate the uprooted population groups, which were socially, economically and politically marginalized, and create the conditions that would allow them to be a dynamic factor in the economic, social, political and cultural development of the country;

3. To give priority to the fight against poverty and extreme poverty, which have had a particularly serious effect on areas where the population has been uprooted, and which largely correspond to the resettlement areas;

4. To develop and strengthen the democratization of State structures, ensuring that the constitutional rights and duties of the uprooted population groups are respected at the community, municipal, departmental, regional and national levels;

5. To promote genuine reconciliation, fostering a culture of peace in the resettlement areas and at the national level based on participation, mutual tolerance, reciprocal respect and commonality of interests.

II. GUARANTEES FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF UPROOTED POPULATION GROUPS

In conformity with past resettlement initiatives and activities, particularly the letter of understanding between the Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the agreement of 8 October 1992 between the Government and the Standing Committees of Refugees, with its ad hoc verification mechanism, the Parties have agreed as follows:

1. Full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential for the security and dignity of resettlement processes. The Parties reiterate their decision to comply fully with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, which took effect on 29 March 1994, promoting respect for the human rights of uprooted populations, one of the vulnerable sectors which deserve particular attention, with special vigilance.

2. Special emphasis should be placed on protecting female-headed families and widows and orphans, who have been the most seriously affected.

3. The rights of the various indigenous communities, primarily Mayas, should be taken into account, especially respect for, and encouragement of, their way of life, cultural identity, customs, traditions and social organization.

4. Concerned about the security of those who are being resettled or who live in the zones affected by the conflict, the Parties recognize the urgent need to remove all types of mines or explosive devices buried or abandoned in these areas, and they commit themselves to cooperate fully in these activities.

5. In view of the efforts being made by uprooted communities to improve the level of education of their people and of the need to support and provide continuity to this process, the Government undertakes to:

5.1. Recognize the formal and informal educational levels of uprooted persons, through the use of rapid evaluation and/or certification procedures;

5.2. Recognize the informal studies of education and health promoters and grant them, following an appropriate evaluation, equivalent credit.

6. The Parties request the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to elaborate a specific plan to support and provide continuity to efforts to educate the population groups in the resettlement areas, including providing continuity to the efforts being made by the uprooted communities.

7. The lack of personal documentation for the majority of the uprooted population groups increases their vulnerability and limits their access to basic services and the enjoyment of their civil and political rights. This problem requires urgent solutions. Consequently, the Parties agree that the following steps are necessary:

7.1. In order to arrange for the documentation of uprooted persons as soon as possible, the Government, with the cooperation of the international community, shall intensify its efforts to streamline the necessary mechanisms, taking into account, where appropriate, the registers kept by the uprooted communities themselves;

7.2. Decree No. 70-91, a provisional act concerning replacement and registration of birth certificates in civil registers destroyed by violence, shall be revised so as to establish a system adapted to the needs of all the affected population groups, with streamlined, free-of-charge registration procedures. For such purposes, the views of the affected sectors shall be taken into account. Personal documentation and identification shall be completed as soon as possible;

7.3. The necessary administrative rules to streamline formalities to ensure that children of uprooted persons born outside the country are registered as native Guatemalans, in compliance with article 144 of the Constitution of the Republic, shall be promulgated;

7.4. For the implementation of this documentation programme, the Government shall request the cooperation of the United Nations and the international community.

8. An essential element of the resettlement process is legal security in the holding (inter alia, the use, ownership and possession) of land. In that

regard, the Parties recognize the existence of a general problem which particularly affects the uprooted population. One of the principal manifestations of legal insecurity is the difficulty of producing evidence of landholding rights. This situation stems, inter alia, from problems concerning registration, the disappearance of the files of the Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria (INTA), the institutional weakness of specialized bodies and municipalities; the existence of rights based on customary systems for the holding and surveying of land; the existence of secondary occupants or the annulment of rights on the basis of the improper application of provisions concerning voluntary abandonment.

9. In the particular case of abandonment of land as a result of armed conflict, the Government undertakes to revise and promote legal provisions to ensure that such an act is not considered to be voluntary abandonment, and to ratify the inalienable nature of landholding rights.

In this context, it shall promote the return of land to the original holders and/or shall seek adequate compensatory solutions.

10. In accordance with the observance of political rights, the organizational practices of the uprooted populations shall be respected, pursuant to the constitutional framework, for the purpose of strengthening the community organization system and to allow these populations to become agents of development and manage their own services and infrastructure. It is important to integrate new groups of resettled populations into the municipal system.

11. The Parties recognize the humanitarian work of non-governmental organizations and churches which are supporting the resettlement processes. The Government shall safeguard their security.

12. The Government undertakes to strengthen its policy for protecting citizens abroad, especially uprooted population groups residing abroad for reasons related to the armed conflict. It shall also ensure the voluntary resettlement of this population group in conditions of security and dignity. With regard to uprooted persons who desire to remain abroad, the Government shall take the necessary steps and conduct the necessary negotiations with the host countries so as to ensure that the migrants are living in a stable situation.

III. PRODUCTIVE INTEGRATION OF UPROOTED POPULATION GROUPS AND DEVELOPMENT OF RESETTLEMENT AREAS

The Parties agree that a comprehensive resettlement strategy presupposes the productive integration of the uprooted population into the framework of a sustained, sustainable and equitable development policy in the resettlement areas and regions that will benefit all the population groups living there. This productive integration policy shall be based on the following criteria and measures:

1. The resettlement areas are predominantly rural. Land, which is a finite resource, is one of the alternative sources of economic and productive integration. Sustainable agricultural development projects are required, in

order to offer the population the means to break the vicious circle of poverty and degradation of natural resources and, in particular, to allow for the productive and ecologically sound protection and development of fragile areas.

2. For the identification of land that could be used for resettling uprooted persons who do not own land but wish to acquire it, the Government undertakes to:

2.1. Carry out a review and updating of official land and real estate registers;

2.2. Conduct studies to identify and individualize all State-owned, municipally owned and private land, offering an option to purchase it. These studies shall include information on the location, legal regime, acquisition, size, boundaries and agricultural suitability of the land in question;

2.3. Complete these studies by the date of entry into force of the present agreement, at the latest.

3. The criteria for selecting land for settlements shall include the agro-ecological potential of the soil, its price, the sustainability of natural resources and existing services.

4. The development of the above-mentioned areas in conditions of justice, equity, maintainability and sustainability shall involve, in addition to agricultural activities, the creation of jobs and income from agro-industry, industry and services, under systems that are appropriate to the rural environment and to the preservation of natural resources. To this end, it is essential to develop basic infrastructure for communications, electrification and production. Public investment shall be geared primarily to this purpose, and a system of investment incentives for rural development in the areas in question shall be established.

5. To improve the quality of life, the objectives of rural development should include: (i) local food security and basic service infrastructure for the population groups, including housing, sanitation, drinking water, rural storage, health and education; (ii) an increase in production and productivity and promotion of local and regional markets for agricultural, agro-industrial and non-industrial products and inputs; (iii) generation of jobs and income; (iv) sustained and sustainable use of the available natural resources, through management of resources at the local level.

6. Productive integration projects and activities related to the comprehensive resettlement strategy shall take into account the following criteria:

6.1. The regional and local aspects of the resettlement areas, and the use of territorial management tools to promote the use of resources in accordance with their best potential;

6.2. Use of the response capacity, organizational levels and expectations of the population, promoting an increasingly organized and informed participation;

6.3. Legalization and award of land titles, and of water rights, to provide the necessary framework of security in the use of these basic natural resources;

6.4. Promotion of local and regional organizations and institutions for the combining of interests and rational planning of the use of available resources;

6.5. Establishment of successive development objectives, based on a prime, immediate objective of food security and adequate nutrition for families and communities;

6.6. Promotion of local and regional markets for products and inputs, and developing appropriate marketing mechanisms for agricultural, agro-industrial and non-industrial products;

6.7. Establishment of basic service infrastructure for population groups: housing, sanitation, drinking water, rural storage, health and education;

6.8. Improvement and/or installation of permanent, competent services of technical support to all organizations and projects, including support to non-governmental organizations which select population groups to help implement their projects;

6.9. Improvement and/or establishment of rural financial and credit assistance services suited to the needs and possibilities of the populations involved;

6.10. Setting up of training programmes designed to diversify and expand the production and management capacity of the beneficiaries.

7. The Government undertakes to put into effect and promote the agreed planning systems for developing the resettlement areas and to ensure that the population groups have access to them as neighbours and residents.

8. The Government undertakes to eliminate any form of de facto or de jure discrimination against women with regard to access to land, housing, credits and participation in development projects. The gender-based approach shall be incorporated into the policies, programmes and activities of the comprehensive development strategy.

9. The solving of each of the problems involved in resettlement and development of the affected areas shall take as a point of departure the study and design of resettlement conditions and the advice, views and organized participation of the uprooted groups and resident communities.

10. The institutional development of municipalities is fundamental in the democratic development process and in the integration of marginalized populations. The Government agrees to intensify the administrative, technical and financial strengthening of local governments and organizations through basic training, occupational training and employment programmes. It shall also strengthen the community organization system so that communities can be their

own agents of development, manage their own systems of services and infrastructure and be duly represented in the management of their own political, legal and economic affairs.

11. The Government also undertakes to expand on its plan for decentralization of public administration, and to enhance its capacity to implement them, gradually transferring decision-making power in the management of resources and administration of services to local communities and governments.

IV. RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

1. The Parties recognize that the responsibility for solving the problems of resettling the uprooted population falls on the entire Guatemalan society, and not on the Government alone. Broad sectors of Guatemalan society must unite their efforts to ensure its success.

2. For its part, the Government undertakes to allocate and mobilize national resources in a manner consistent with its efforts at macroeconomic stabilization and modernization of the economy; and to reorient and target public expenditure towards fighting poverty and resettling the uprooted population.

3. The Parties recognize that the series of tasks relating to the resettlement of the uprooted population is of such breadth and complexity that the strong support of the international community is needed in order to complement the domestic efforts of the Government and of the various sectors of civil society. Otherwise, the Government's commitment would be limited by financial constraints.

V. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. The agreements contained in the comprehensive resettlement strategy shall be implemented through the execution of specific projects.

2. For that purpose the Parties agree to establish a Technical Committee for the implementation of the resettlement agreement, to be composed of two representatives designated by the Government, two representatives designated by the uprooted population groups and two representatives of donors, cooperating bodies and international cooperating agencies. The latter representatives shall have consultative status. The Committee shall draw up its own rules of procedure.

3. The Committee shall be established within 60 days following the signing of this Agreement and to that end the Government of Guatemala shall issue the corresponding governmental decree.

4. The Committee shall, from the time it is established until the entry into force of this Agreement, conduct the necessary evaluations and studies in order to identify and analyse the needs and demands of the uprooted population and to formulate projects corresponding to the various undertakings contained in the strategy determined in this Agreement. In carrying out said studies and

analyses and formulating projects the Committee shall have the technical support of the corresponding specialized personnel.

5. Once the study phase is completed and as soon as this Agreement enters into force, the Committee shall be responsible for prioritizing and approving projects and supervising their execution, allocating the funds required in each case and securing technical and financial resources. The Parties agree that implementation of the strategy shall meet the criteria of priority to the struggle against poverty, efficient management, participation of the recipient populations and transparency concerning expenditures.

6. For the purpose of ensuring implementation of the resettlement strategy, the Parties agree to establish a fund to implement the agreement on resettlement of population groups uprooted by armed conflict essentially with contributions from the international community. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shall be asked to administer the funds of each of the projects to be executed.

VI. FINAL PROVISION

In accordance with the Framework Agreement of 10 January 1994, this Agreement shall be subject to international verification by the United Nations.

Oslo, 17 June 1994

For the Government of the Republic of Guatemala

(Signed)
Héctor ROSADA GRANADOS

(Signed)
General Carlos Enrique PINEDA CARRANDA

(Signed)
Antonio ARENALES FORNO

(Signed)
General Julio Arnoldo BALCONI TURCIOS

(Signed)
Mario PERMUTH

(Signed)
General José Horacio SOTO SALAN

(Signed)
Amilcar BURGOS SOLIS

For the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

General Command

(Signed)
Commander Rolando MORAN

(Signed)
Commander Pablo MONSANTO

(Signed)
Commander Gaspar ILOM

(Signed)
Carlos GONZALEZ

Political and Diplomatic Commission

(Signed)
Luis Felipe BECKER GUZMAN

(Signed)
Miguel Angel SANDOVAL

(Signed)
Francisco VILLAGRAN MUNOZ

(Signed)
Luz MENDEZ GUTIERREZ

Advisers

(Signed)
Mario Vinicio CASTAÑEDA

(Signed)
Miguel Angel REYES

(Signed)
Jorge ROSAL

For the United Nations

(Signed)
Jean ARNAULT
Moderator

ANNEX II

Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer

Whereas the present-day history of our country is marked by grave acts of violence, disregard for the fundamental rights of the individual and suffering of the population connected with the armed conflict;

Whereas the people of Guatemala have a right to know the whole truth concerning these events, clarification of which will help avoid a repetition of these sad and painful events and strengthen the process of democratization in Guatemala;

Reiterating its wish to comply fully with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights of 29 March 1994;

Reiterating its wish to open as soon as possible a new chapter in Guatemala's history which, being the culmination of a lengthy process of negotiation, will put an end to the armed conflict and help lay the bases for peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights among Guatemalans;

Whereas, in this context, promotion of a culture of harmony and mutual respect that will eliminate any form of revenge or vengeance is a prerequisite for a firm and lasting peace,

The Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (hereafter referred to as "the Parties") have agreed as follows:

To establish a Commission whose terms of reference shall be as follows:

Purposes

I. To clarify with all objectivity, equity and impartiality the human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer, connected with the armed conflict.

II. To prepare a report that will contain the findings of the investigations carried out and provide objective information regarding events during this period covering all factors, internal as well as external.

III. Formulate specific recommendations to encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala. The Commission shall recommend, in particular, measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of human rights and to strengthen the democratic process.

Period covered

The Commission's investigations shall cover the period from the start of the armed conflict until the signing of the firm and lasting peace agreement.

Operation

I. The Commission shall receive particulars and information from individuals or institutions that consider themselves to be affected and also from the Parties.

II. The Commission shall be responsible for clarifying these situations fully and in detail. In particular, it shall analyse the factors and circumstances involved in those cases with complete impartiality. The Commission shall invite those who may be in possession of relevant information to submit their version of the incidents. Failure of those concerned to appear shall not prevent the Commission from reaching a determination on the cases.

III. The Commission shall not attribute responsibility to any individual in its work, recommendations and report nor shall these have any judicial aim or effect.

IV. The Commission's proceedings shall be confidential so as to guarantee the secrecy of the sources and the safety of witnesses and informants.

V. Once it is established, the Commission shall publicize the fact that it has been established and the place where it is meeting by all possible means, and shall invite interested parties to present their information and their testimony.

Composition

The Commission shall consist of the following three members:

(i) The present Moderator of the peace negotiations, whom the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be asked to appoint.

(ii) One member, a Guatemalan of irreproachable conduct, appointed by the Moderator with the agreement of the Parties.

(iii) One academic selected by the Moderator, with the agreement of the Parties, from a list proposed by the University presidents.

The Commission shall have whatever support staff it deems necessary, with the requisite qualifications, in order to carry out its tasks.

Installation and duration

The Commission shall be set up, installed and shall start to work as of the day the firm and lasting peace agreement is signed. The Commission shall work for a period of six months starting from the date of its installation; this period may be extended for a further six months if the Commission so decides.

Report

The Commission shall prepare a report which shall be handed over to the parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall publish it.

Inability to investigate all the cases or situations presented to the Commission shall not detract from the report's validity.

Commitment of the Parties

The Parties undertake to collaborate with the Commission in all matters that may be necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate. In particular, they undertake to establish, prior to setting up the Commission and during its operations, the necessary conditions so that the Commission may fulfil the terms of reference established in the present agreement.

International verification

In conformity with the Framework Agreement of 10 January 1994, implementation of this Agreement shall be subject to international verification by the United Nations.

Measures for prompt execution following the signing of this Agreement

The Parties agree to ask the Secretary-General to appoint the Moderator of the negotiations as a member of the Commission as soon as possible. When he is appointed, he shall be authorized to proceed forthwith to make all necessary arrangements to ensure that the Commission functions smoothly once it is established and installed in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement.

Oslo, 23 June 1994

For the Government of the Republic of Guatemala

(Signed)
Héctor ROSADA GRANADOS

(Signed)
General Carlos Enrique PINEDA CARRANZA

(Signed)
Antonio M. ARENALES FORNO

(Signed)
General Julio Arnoldo BALCONI TURCIOS

(Signed)
Mario PERMUTH

(Signed)
General José Horacio SOTO SALAN

(Signed)
Amilcar BURGOS SOLIS

For the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

General Command

(Signed)
Carlos GONZALES

(Signed)
Commander Rolando MORAN

(Signed)
Commander Gaspar ILOM

(Signed)
Commander Pablo MONSANTO

Political and Diplomatic Commission

(Signed)
Luis Felipe BECKER GUZMAN

(Signed)
Miguel Angel SANDOVAL

(Signed)
Francisco VILLAGRAN MUÑOZ

(Signed)
Luz MENDEZ GUTIERREZ

Advisers

(Signed)
Mario Vinicio CASTAÑEDA

(Signed)
Miguel Angel REYES

(Signed)
Jorge ROSAL

For the United Nations

(Signed)

Jean ARNAULT
Moderator

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/752
24 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 772 (1992) of 17 August 1992 and 894 (1994) of 14 January 1994,

Noting with great satisfaction the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic government of South Africa,

Welcoming General Assembly resolutions A/RES/48/13 C and A/RES/48/258 A of 23 June 1994,

1. Welcomes the final report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) (S/1994/717);

2. Commends the vital role played by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNOMSA, together with the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Union, in support of the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa;

3. Decides that, with the successful completion of its mandate, UNOMSA is terminated forthwith;

4. Also decides that it has concluded its consideration of the item entitled "The question of South Africa" and hereby removes this item from the list of matters of which the Council is seized.

94-26508 (E) 270694

270694

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/753
25 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq (S/1994/621 of 26 May 1994) and similar Iraqi letters addressed to you, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention.

The concerned authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have recently observed illegal movements of some vessels in Arvandrood which were wrongfully and without authorization using the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, vessels have also been heading towards Iraqi ports while declaring Iranian ports as their final destination. Against this background, the Islamic Republic of Iran has resorted to limited measures in Arvandrood in order to curb these a activities which not only violate Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity but also the international sanctions against Iraq. In this context, it is worth mentioning that during recent months, the Iranian authorities have seized a number of non-Iranian ships carrying goods to Iraq through Arvandrood. These ships were either carrying Iranian flag without the consent of Iranian authorities or were declaring Iranian ports as their final destination.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran holds the Iraqi regime responsible for the consequences of its actions which are in violation of international law and regulations as well as the principle of good neighbourliness.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, reaffirming its full compliance with the cease-fire established under Security Council resolution 598 as well as its total commitment to the provisions of the Treaty concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations of 13 June 1975 and its Protocols, reiterates its desire for improvement of relations with Iraq on the basis of principles of good neighbourliness and international law.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-26430 (E) 250694 27/06/94

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/754
26 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MYANMAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to paragraphs 2 to 14 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994 concerning the sanctions against Haiti, has the honour to inform him that the Government of the Union of Myanmar, in conformity with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, has instituted all necessary measures for meeting the obligations set out in the resolution mentioned above.

94-26442 (E) 270694 27/06/94

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/755
26 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF COLOMBIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994), of 6 May 1994, concerning the embargo against Haiti, has the honour to inform him that the Government of Colombia has taken all appropriate measures to implement the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution.

94-26448 (E) 270694 270694

270694